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Abstract 
Comparing Agricultural Financing in Uruguay and New Zealand 
by 
Alejandro Capurro 
 
In 2008, New Zealand’s gross domestic product (GDP) was four times the size of Uruguay’s, 
and its export earnings were five times Uruguay’s. Nevertheless, agricultural products 
accounted for over 60% of export earnings for both economies. This highlighted the 
importance that the agricultural sectors of Uruguay and New Zealand had to their respective 
foreign trade sectors. The success with which both countries’ agricultural sectors solved their 
financial needs would be influential to their export sectors and overall economies. Through 
the use of expert interviews, a multiple-case study strategy was employed to carry out a 
comparative study of the agricultural financing systems of Uruguay and New Zealand. The 
findings revealed contrasting situations in both countries. Chief among them were the 
differences encountered in agricultural debt relative to agriculture’s contribution to total GDP 
in each country. In Uruguay this figure was 26% whereas in New Zealand it amounted to 
almost 400%. The differences found were largely attributable to the institutional frameworks 
in place in each country (i.e. the legal and cultural norms that structure political, social and 
economic interactions), as well as the historical contexts in which the institutions evolved. In 
Uruguay, the institutional framework limited producers’ possibilities of accessing bank credit 
due to restrictive central bank regulations. The lack of access to international credit markets 
by Uruguayan banks due to the country’s unfavourable credit risk rating was an additional 
factor which limited credit availability. These were largely a result of the financial crisis (and 
the subsequent recession) that had occurred in the region in 2002. Producers in Uruguay were 
able to access costlier seasonal capital and some medium-term capital from informal lenders 
such as cooperatives, processors and input suppliers. Nevertheless, if they required medium 
and long term credit, Uruguayan farmers needed to deal with the banking system. 
Furthermore, the high cost of registering mortgages, combined with long-term loan facilities 
that generally did not go for longer than ten years, resulted in a limited demand for high-
volume, long-term credit on producers’ side. Almost the exact opposite situation was found in 
 iii
New Zealand. No great financial turmoil had affected New Zealand since the economic 
reforms of 1984, in which the economy in general was deregulated. An institutional 
framework which promoted access to credit, combined with a favourable country credit risk 
rating which promoted open access to overseas funding for banks, meant that the agricultural 
sector was able to expand its use of credit uninterruptedly since the early 1990s. Also, in 
contrast with the Uruguayan case, mortgaging of properties was relatively straightforward and 
inexpensive, and long term lending could be approved for terms of generally up to 20 years. 
These factors contributed to the expansion of rural credit in New Zealand. However, New 
Zealand’s agricultural debt was found to be greatly exposed to one subsector (the dairy 
farming sector). Moreover, the level of debt of New Zealand’s agricultural sector surpassed its 
contribution to GDP many times over, which raised doubts concerning the long-term 
sustainability of that level of debt.  
 
Key Words: Uruguay agriculture, New Zealand agriculture, agricultural credit, agricultural 
finance, institutions, institutional framework, agency theory. 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Aim 
The aim of this research is to identify and assess the differences and similarities 
between the Uruguayan and New Zealand agricultural financing systems. This will be 
achieved via an in-depth study of how the agricultural sector in Uruguay and New 
Zealand is financed and what are the factors that allow and/or limit the sector’s access 
to finance.  
 
To broaden the depth of the research, the study will also analyse how financing is 
carried out in the particular segments of Uruguayan and New Zealand agriculture that 
are considered of special importance due to their contribution to the sector’s 
performance as a whole. For the purposes of this research, the term “agricultural 
sector” will encompass all agricultural, horticultural and forestry-related activities 
behind the farm gate.   
 
1.2 The importance of agriculture in Uruguay and New 
Zealand 
 
A comparison between aspects of the agricultural sectors of Uruguay and New 
Zealand is relevant because of the similarities that exist between the two. Even though 
Uruguay’s 2008 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 32.2 billion was 
approximately one quarter of New Zealand’s 2008 GDP of USD 128 billion (MGAP, 
2009; NZ Treasury 2009a), the importance of the agricultural sector to both 
economies is strikingly similar.  
 
Farmland comprises 15.3 million hectares of Uruguay’s 17.3 million hectares, while 
New Zealand’s farming sector covers 14.7 million of its 26.8 million hectares 
(MGAP, 2009; Statistics NZ, 2008a). In the case of New Zealand it is a smaller 
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proportion of the country’s total surface, due to much of the country being covered by 
extensive, mountainous ranges. A further parallel between both countries’ agricultural 
sectors is that pasture-based livestock farming and forestry comprise a large 
proportion of farm areas in both countries (Table 1 and Table 2). 
 
Table 1: Uruguay’s 2008 farm areas by sub-sector.  
 
Farming Sub-Sector Surface (hectares) 
Sheep & Beef (specialised & mixed) 13,186,000
Mixed Grain & Livestock 2,623,000
Dry land Grain & Oilseed cropping 1,000,900
Forestry (exc. indigenous) 952,431
Dairy 849,000
Rice Cropping 168,337
Fruit & Vegetable 50,671
Total             18,830,339  
 
NOTE: Total area is overestimated due to overlap among some sub-sector areas. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from MGAP (2009) 
 
Table 2: New Zealand’s 2007 farm areas by sub-sector.  
 
Category Surface (hectares) 
Sheep & Beef (specialised & mixed) 9,848,363
Dairy 1,962,724
Forestry 1,849,897
Deer farming 364,473
Fruit & Vegetable 232,746
Mixed Grain & Livestock 118,229
Grain 111,606
Other Cropping 88,581
Other Livestock farming 80,008
Pig farming 17,481
Other Horticulture 14,002
Poultry farming 6,550
Other 6,146
Total 14,700,806
 
Source: Own elaboration base on data from Statistics NZ (2008a). 
 
Despite the fact that the agricultural sector accounts for different proportions of each 
country’s GDP (6.1% in New Zealand and 9.1% in Uruguay), the common 
denominator found is that in both economies this sector contributes substantially to 
overall export earnings: over 60% in both countries in 2008 (MGAP, 2009; Statistics 
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NZ, 2009; Treasury, 2009a) . In other words, it can be said that the agricultural sectors 
from both countries are highly trade-oriented (Table 3 and Table 4).  
 
Table 3: Value of Uruguay’s 2008 agricultural exports by product category.  
 
Category USD (000 fob) % 
Meat & Meat Products 1,293,610 32.6 
Cereals & Oilseeds 1,132,552 28.5 
Forestry and Forestry 
Products 461,913 11.6 
Dairy Products 434,406 10.9 
Raw hides, skins & leather 284,068 7.1 
Wool 167,372 4.2 
Fruit 88,307 2.2 
Live animal exports 65,360 1.6 
Other Agriculture 45,708 1.2 
Sub-Total Agriculture 3,973,296 100.0 
Total Exports 5,948,948 - 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from MGAP (2009) 
 
Table 4: Value of New Zealand’s 2008 agricultural exports by product category.  
 
Category NZD (000 fob) % 
Dairy Products       10,373,056 39.2
Meat and Meat Products        5,445,609 20.6
Forestry and Forestry Products 3,382,002 12.8
Fruit & Vegetables        2,097,572 7.9
Wool           734,088 2.8
Raw hides, skins & leather           509,048 1.9
Wine           903,345 3.4
Other Agriculture        2,999,380 11.3
Sub-total agriculture       26,444,100 100.0
Total Exports       42,900,223 - 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Statistics NZ (2009) 
 
Agricultural commodities have an important role in both countries’ exporting sectors. 
The success with which financing is sourced by the Uruguayan and New Zealand 
agricultural sectors could therefore be presumed to be influential to the economic 
success of both country’s export sectors and overall economies. 
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    Chapter 2 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
In the following sections, the theoretical foundations on which the research will be 
based are addressed. The relevant areas addressed at this stage include new 
institutional economics, agency theory and modern finance.  
 
2.1 Institutions and economic performance 
 
The level of interaction that producers from both countries’ agricultural sectors have 
with different types of financial agents in order to acquire debt capital will depend on 
many factors. Among these are included the cost and term of credit, the level of 
securities required by financial agents, the availability of credit and the readiness of 
financial agents to provide credit to borrowers in exchange for collateral and future 
profit. All of these are affected in some way or another by what has been termed by 
the New Institutional Economics as the “Institutional Framework”. 
 
North (1991) has defined institutions as restrictions devised by people in order to 
structure political, social and economic interactions. They include informal constraints 
such as customs, traditions and codes of conduct, as well as formal rules which 
include constitutions, laws and property rights. In other words, institutions can be 
considered the “rules of the game”, be they written or otherwise.  
 
According to North (1991) the object of creating institutions is to reduce uncertainty 
and create order so as to determine production and transaction costs and therefore the 
profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity. For instance, they may 
serve as a means to reduce the costs of information, implementation and enforcement 
in contracts. These constraints may be self-enforceable if the participants share 
cultural beliefs or social norms, or enforced by a third party (e.g. a court) or an 
organisation (Aoki, 1996). Institutions are also essential for the coordination of 
agents’ plans, through the promotion of cooperative behaviour and curbing of 
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opportunistic behaviour, which results in agents internalising externalities as well as a 
reduction of uncertainty (Gagliardi, 2008).  
 
The legal environment (legal rules and their enforcement) influences the size and 
extent of a country’s capital markets. La Porta et al (1997) observe that a good legal 
environment provides protection to potential investors against expropriation by 
entrepreneurs, increases their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for 
securities, and therefore expands the extent of capital markets.  
 
2.1.1 Path dependence of institutions 
What can also be appreciated from the existing literature is that institutions are not 
static over time, but ever-evolving and adapting to changing environments. This can 
result in optimal as well as sub-optimal institutional frameworks governing the 
economic activity of different countries, and therefore their economic performance. 
The institutional framework provides the incentive structure of an economy, and 
creates opportunities for organisations to evolve. This evolution tends to be 
incremental (North, 1991). 
 
In this sense, Gagliardi (2008) states that institutions are history-specific, so therefore 
there must be an awareness of the historical context in order to deal with institutional 
change. Path dependence can explain why some countries are successful and others 
aren’t. According to Aoki (1996), the relative success of certain economies at specific 
points in time may be generated by the extent to which their path-dependent 
institutional arrangements are efficient for a particular combination of external factors 
rather than their intrinsic superiority. 
 
Economic models predict that less developed countries should catch up with their 
richer counterparts, while the evidence shows that this has yet to happen, supporting 
the path dependence theory (Gagliardi, 2008). Understanding the historical contexts 
that have shaped the institutional frameworks of the Uruguayan and New Zealand 
agricultural financing will therefore be a necessary component of this research in 
order to comprehend why the encountered differences exist.  
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2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory concerns itself with the problems that arise when one party (the 
principal) delegates a task and decision-making power to another party (the agent). 
These problems are the result of information asymmetry as well as conflicting goals 
and risk preferences (Jensen & Meckler, 1976).  
 
Among the factors that contribute to these agency problems are moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to agents not behaving as agreed due to the 
agent and the principal having different goals, whereas adverse selection occurs due to 
a misrepresentation of an agent’s ability to undertake a given task (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The agent may not share the principal’s goals, and may be more familiar with the 
details of the task at hand. Therefore, the agent may have the motive and opportunity 
to act in a self-serving manner at the principal’s expense (Lassar & Kerr, 1996) 
 
Aoki (1996) states that principal-agent theory aims to understand institutions as 
contractual arrangements between parties under conditions of asymmetric 
information. The effectiveness of contracts and organisations depends on the 
institutional framework that defines options for organisational participants as well as 
constraining individual and organisational behaviour (Aoki, 1996).  
 
Barry & Robison (2001) see principal-agent relationships as important to agricultural 
finance. Lenders in this sector have two basic concerns, namely whether the borrower 
is riskier than believed when the loan was originated (adverse selection), and whether 
the borrower will take on greater risks during the term of the loan than were originally 
anticipated (moral hazard). These problems are attributed to incentive and information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. 
 
To mitigate adverse selection, creditors use non-price screening devices such as 
collateral and character assessment. Moral hazard may also be mitigated with these 
devices, as the use of high risk premiums may increase its incidence (Beck & De La 
Torre, 2007). Non-price methods that address agency cost problems also include, 
according to Barry & Robison (2001), loan repayment upon demand provisions, 
reporting requirements, performance standards, constraints on additional borrowing, 
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insurance requirements, default penalties and foreclosure conditions, as well as the 
risk of non-renewal of loans if agency costs are excessive. 
 
Due to information and enforcement costs, some markets may be uncompetitive, or 
even non-existent. Gagliardi (1998) points out that there is the recognition that an 
agency problem exists in contractual arrangements in which contracts are incomplete 
and/or information is asymmetric, and the actions of an agent can affect the principal. 
These problems can be manifested as adverse selection and moral hazard. According 
to this author, an asymmetric information approach can be useful in understanding 
institutions in both developed and developing countries. However, if information 
problems are too much of an obstacle, public policies and institutional regulations 
may be developed to bolster market performance (Barry & Robison, 2001). 
 
Firms should have easier access to external financing in countries where there are 
stricter information requirements, which would reduce agency problems. The 
downside of this is that risky firms may encounter difficulties in accessing financing 
for this very reason. Banking systems with prudent regulation that reduces bank risk-
taking also reduce the need for collateral assets to access credit. Improvement in the 
institutional framework can therefore foster economic performance as financial 
constraints are reduced (Utrero-Gonzalez, 2007).  Furthermore, this author finds that 
in countries with better creditor protection, problems involving lack of collateral 
assets are reduced, therefore reducing agency problems. 
 
2.3 Issues concerning access to finance  
 
Beck & De La Torre (2007) find that creditors may tend to deny loans to certain 
borrowers if they face great challenges in mitigating problems of adverse selection, 
moral hazard or contract enforcement. Creditors may also tend to deny loans if they 
face large macroeconomic risks. Across countries the authors observe a large 
variation in the efficiency with which financial markets overcome frictions in order to 
provide financial services. Countries with poor investor protections have smaller debt 
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and equity markets, something which evidences a link between legal systems and 
economic development (La Porta et al, 1997). 
 
Default risk is one of the key determinants of access to finance by individuals and/or 
firms, and it is of two types. The first is systemically originated risk, which arises 
from macroeconomic uncertainty (inflation and exchange rate volatility, terms of 
trade, real interest), weak contractual and informational environment, or geographical 
limitations. If this type of risk is high, it can hamper credit availability, as it increases 
the probability of default. This results in a higher floor of interest rates that creditors 
must require in order to make a loan, due to the higher cost of funds (Beck & De La 
Torre, 2007).  
 
The second type, idiosyncratic risk, is specific to individual borrowers or projects, 
which will cause the cost of finance to differ across debtors, which will in turn be 
reflected as a spread over the interest rate floor set by systemic risk. This is a 
reflection of market incompleteness such as the lack of sufficient markets for hedges 
or insurance products. Beck & De La Torre (2007) mention that this results in risk-
adverse creditors including risk premiums over the lending interest rates. High risk 
premiums can undermine credit supply outreach, as they can render loans 
unaffordable for many borrowers. This lack of risk diversification may be the case of 
agricultural lending in many developing countries. 
 
2.4 Agricultural Finance 
Agricultural finance centres on the agricultural sector’s acquisition and use of 
financial capital, both in developed and less developed countries. Financial capital 
includes debt, equity and leased capital, and each of these may include numerous 
forms (Barry & Robison, 2001). These authors also find that the dominance of real 
estate in the overall financial assets that a farming business possesses indicates a low 
asset-liquidity of the sector. This is something that creates a demand for longer-term 
financing and the cautious matching of repayment obligations to projected cash flows. 
This latter item is due to the fact that income for this type of business is largely 
dependent on biological cycles.   
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Gloy et al. (2005) indicate that farm businesses vary in their proportion of total assets 
that are long term, length of business and cash flow cycles, price and yield variability, 
and availability of risk management tools. When subjected to financial analysis, the 
US farming sector in particular is a sector that has chronic liquidity and cash flow 
problems due to often-volatile current rates of return to farm assets (Barry & Robison, 
2001). These authors also point out that these characteristics can make farming 
susceptible to downward swings in farm income and land values, affecting its 
creditworthiness and debt-serving capacity.  
 
Lenders encounter economies of size with borrowers, as providing clients with larger 
volumes of credit is generally more cost effective than providing small loan volumes. 
However, increased loan volumes encounter the problem of concentrating risk. 
Providing capital over longer periods of time brings greater uncertainty regarding 
success of the enterprise, repayment, and the lender’s cost structure. This can be offset 
with higher quality collateral and lower servicing costs (Gloy et al., 2005).  
 
Continued exchanges between suppliers and users of capital lead to the forging of 
relationships. The anticipated results of effective relationships are reduced costs of 
financing transactions and an increase in the availability of financial capital due to the 
generation of reliable and accurate information that can be used in the evaluation and 
monitoring of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers (Barry & Robison, 2001). 
 
On the same topic, Moss et al. (1997) found that loyalty developed from good 
relationships is important in determining borrowers’ decisions of whether or not to 
continue doing business with a particular lender. Good communication between 
lenders and borrowers reduces the negative effects of asymmetric information, 
therefore reducing the level of problem loans. This offsets the higher initial cost of 
establishing the relationship. In addition, Gloy et al. (2005) found that the length of 
the lender/borrower relationship was influential to costs, as monitoring and servicing 
costs fell when relationships lasted longer.  
 
There are many different types of market actors that provide finance for the 
agricultural sector. Types of agricultural lenders, according to Barry & Robison 
(2001), include commercial banking systems, specialised agricultural lending 
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organisations, government programs at a national or regional level, farm-related trade 
or agribusiness firms, financial organisations, individuals, and asset-backed loan 
pools.  
 
In a review of financial support for agriculture in Western European and North 
American countries, Nazarenko (2007) found differences between countries with 
regard to the roles of banks and their policies relating to the agricultural sector. In the 
Netherlands, 90% of agricultural credit is supplied by Rabobank, a cooperative bank. 
Credit Agricole is the main supplier of agricultural credit in France, though there has 
been an increase in competition from other finance providers. In the UK however, 
there is no specialised agricultural bank, and policies towards agriculture are the same 
as for other economic sectors. In Canada agricultural finance is dominated by Farm 
Credit Canada, a government corporation, whereas in the US there is strong 
competition between commercial banks for business from the agricultural sector.  
 
The National Bank’s December 2008 Rural Report (Wilson, 2008) states that there 
has been an erosion of confidence in banks, and a restriction in the level of bank 
lending, as well as a rise in risk premiums on interest rates as a result of the present 
financial crisis. The report predicts that there will be more regulation plus tighter and 
higher compliance standards, such as higher capital adequacy ratios.  
 
Regarding tighter capital adequacy regulations, the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision) may aid financial institutions via a more accurate 
assessment of the risk rating of their loan portfolio (Featherstone et al., 2006). The 
authors mentioned that agricultural credit providers in the US would have to alter their 
risk-rating systems to benefit from the changes outlined by the Basel Accord.  
 
When analysing how Canadian and US banks are adapting to the changing regulatory 
requirements of the new Basel Capital Accord, Pederson & Zech (2009) mention that 
agricultural lenders encounter problems when attempting to adapt credit risk models 
to their own risk environments. This is due to agriculture being characterised by 
seasonal production, high capital intensity and cyclical performance of farm 
businesses. In addition, when considering the Canadian and US agricultural sectors, 
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the authors found that information on the default characteristics of agricultural loans 
are scarce.  
 
In a study of agricultural credit markets in Latin America (which included Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Peru), Boucher et al (2008) found that information asymmetries and 
enforcement costs caused a reduction in the available set of contracts by setting high 
interest rates and/or high collateral requirements. Quantity rationing of credit occurs 
when there is a reduction in loan contract options for borrowers who lack the wealth 
to fully collateralise loans. The authors also identified what they termed “risk 
rationing”. This was found to occur when insurance markets were absent or imperfect, 
thereby causing lenders to shift high levels of contractual risk onto borrowers. High-
collateral and moral hazard-proof contracts exposed borrowers to unacceptable levels 
of collateral loss-risk, which resulted in them withdrawing from the credit market.  
 
In a related study involving the same countries, Boucher & Guirkinger (2007) found 
that formal and informal credit sectors existed side by side despite large differences in 
interest rates charged, as well as there being recent financial liberalisation moves 
aimed at broadening and deepening formal credit markets. Informal lenders catered to 
clients who either were unable to post the collateral required, or were unwilling to 
post collateral required to secure a loan. In these cases of quantity and risk rationing, 
informal lenders offered credit to those excluded from the cheaper formal sector by 
substituting information-intensive screening and monitoring for collateral. 
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    Chapter 3 
The Research 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
In order to achieve the research aims that have been set out, a series of research 
questions were put forth to guide the research process: 
 
• What is the structure of the agricultural financial system in each country? 
 
• How are the institutional frameworks constituted in either country in order 
to facilitate the financing of agricultural activities? 
 
• How are agency problems tackled when providing finance to 
firms/individuals in either country?  
 
• What reasons are there for the differences encountered? 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The case study methodology was selected as there was a need for in-depth 
information from each case. The research consisted of evaluating two distinct 
situations (i.e. the Uruguayan and the New Zealand cases). It therefore constituted a 
multiple-case study, as it involved two cases with distinct geographical, political, 
social and economic contexts (Creswell & Maietta, 2002). 
 
Holistic and embedded designs are two possibilities for case studies, according to Yin 
(2003). A holistic design is recommended if the case study is examining the global 
nature of an organisation or of a program, and is advantageous when no logical sub-
units can be identified. The embedded design on the other hand, identifies sub-units 
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within the case study, and therefore provides the researcher with a more focused 
approach for procuring the information needed. The use of the embedded design can 
also provide opportunities for a more extensive analysis of the case study. This is 
desirable, though the researcher must be careful not to give too much attention to the 
subunits because of the danger there is that the holistic aspects of the whole case may 
be ignored.   
 
The design found to be most suited for each case study had aspects of an embedded 
design as well as those from a holistic design. The major sub-units identified within 
each case were banking and non-banking sectors from which finance for agriculture is 
sourced. A holistic approach was used to analyse certain aspects of the case study that 
concerned the financing of agriculture in general, and an embedded approach was 
used to analyse others that were sub-sector-specific. 
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
Sources of information identified by Yin (2003) include: documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical 
artefacts. For the purpose of this research the first three sources in that list were used. 
 
The collection of information in this research was partly achieved through a series of 
personal semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions with a number of key 
informants. The informants consisted of individuals who held relevant positions in 
organisations that provide financial resources to agricultural activities in either 
country, or are involved in a significant way with the agricultural financing sector. 
Different interview guides were constructed taking into account the fact that 
informants from different types of organisations could have access to a better quality 
of information regarding certain subject matters than others.  
 
This format not only made it possible to obtain the required information from the 
interviewed subjects; it also enabled them to explore the issues and voice their 
opinions about different topics. The informants were also requested to provide, if 
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possible, any additional information in the form of documentation or archival records 
that could be relevant to the research. 
 
The informants were initially contacted via telephone and/or email some time before 
the fieldwork started in order to communicate to them the nature of the research and 
ensure their cooperation. Subsequently, the informants who agreed to participate in 
the research were contacted once again to set up dates and times for the interviews. 
There were two potential informants on the Uruguayan side who did not reply to 
requests for interviews. In addition, there was one informant from Uruguay who had 
at first agreed to an interview, but was ultimately unable to do so due to scheduling 
issues. On the New Zealand side, there was one informant who had initially agreed to 
be interviewed but could not be located when the time came to coordinate a date for 
the interview. All interviewees were key informants who were interviewed 
exclusively with respect to their professional expertise. Accordingly, in line with 
Lincoln University procedures, human ethics approval was delegated to the 
supervisors who approved the interview methods. 
 
The interview phase was split in two parts. The first phase occurred from the 1st of 
May to the 15th of June 2009, in which 17 key informants were interviewed in 
Uruguay. An additional source in Uruguay provided information via e-mail. The 
second phase took place from the 16th of June to the 30th of July 2009, where 10 key 
informants were interviewed in New Zealand. The names of all sources have been 
suppressed to maintain confidentiality. A list of the sources, in which their positions 
in their organisations are described, can be found in Appendix A. Samples of the 
interview guides are included in Appendix B.  
 
The difference in the number of key informants needed in each country was due to the 
different complexities in their agricultural financing systems. The supply of credit to 
New Zealand’s agricultural sector is the almost exclusive domain of the banking 
sector. On the other hand, Uruguay’s agricultural sector has a wider range of sources 
from which to obtain financing. It includes, apart from the banking sector, various 
input suppliers, cooperative organisations and agricultural industries. Therefore, the 
more complex nature of Uruguay’s agricultural financing environment required a 
larger number of key informants in order to understand its diversity.  
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The research also relied on the collection of secondary data (i.e. data that had already 
been collected by someone other than the researcher), in order to corroborate and/or 
complement the information gathered in the interviews. These secondary data sources 
included censuses, surveys, and statistics among others from government or privately-
owned entities.  
 
3.4 Data Interpretation 
 
Within-case and cross-case theme development were found to be suitable methods 
with which to analyse the data generated from the key informant interviews, as well as 
the information collected from secondary sources. This strategy consists of looking 
within each case for relevant themes, and across all cases for themes which can be 
either common or different (Creswell & Maietta, 2002). The analysis of the 
information gathered should also take into account the holistic and embedded aspects 
of the case studies.   
 
The information gathered from each country was therefore analysed in order to find 
relevant themes and issues. The cases were then compared and contrasted with each 
other with the purpose of identifying which themes and/or issues were common to 
them, and which were different. In addition, the findings were linked back to the 
literature reviewed to see if they concurred with expectations.  
 
As a result of this data analysis process, the expectation is that satisfactory 
explanations will be found to the differences and/or similarities (if any) between both 
countries’ agricultural financing systems. Tentatively, this would also provide insights 
regarding the successes and shortcomings of either system.  
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    Chapter 4 
Findings 
 
The following section encompasses the processed information gathered during the 
data-collection phase. It combines the findings from the interviews with key 
informants, in both Uruguay and New Zealand, with information from a number of 
secondary sources. 
 
4.1 Uruguay 
4.1.1 Macro Environment 
4.1.1.1 Structure of Uruguay’s financial system 
 
The Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU) was established by law in 1967, and is 
Uruguay’s central bank. The BCU carries out its legal charge through certain actions 
and powers (BCU, 2009g). In order to carry out its commitment, the BCU has the 
authority to:  
 
• Issue Uruguayan banknotes and coins, and to withdraw them from circulation 
at any time. 
• Apply the monetary, exchange and credit instruments deemed necessary to 
fulfil its legal charge.  
• Act on behalf of the Government as its banker, financial representative and 
economic advisor. 
• Administrate the State’s international financial reserves. 
• Act as banker on behalf of financial intermediation entities. 
• Represent the Uruguayan Government in international financial entities, and 
execute financial transactions related to the State’s participation in said 
entities. 
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• Regulate, via the use of norms and their enforcement, the activities of public 
and private entities that are a part of the financial system. 
 
In 2009, Uruguay’s financial system included 14 registered banks, and 15 non-bank 
financial entities. Among the registered banks are Uruguay’s two government-owned 
banks, Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay (BROU), and Banco Hipotecario 
del Uruguay (BHU). The BROU provides a broad spectrum of financial services to 
depositors and borrowers, and with 124 outlets it has the strongest presence in the 
country. The BHU specialises only in the provision of credit for housing. The other 12 
registered banks are all private and all foreign-owned (BCU, 2009f; Monje, 2009).  
 
The 15 non-bank financial entities comprise five finance companies which only take 
deposits from non-residents, but can provide loans to residents and non-residents 
alike; five off-shore banks which take deposits as well as provide loans only to non-
residents; four retirement-fund administration firms and; one credit and savings 
cooperative. Other registered entities of the financial sector include exchange bureaus, 
credit administration firms, and representatives for financial companies that have been 
incorporated overseas (BCU, 2009f; Monje, 2009).  
 
The registered banks’ asset base represented 98.5% of total assets of the financial 
system at the end of 2008. The state-owned banks, BROU and BHU, held 39% and 
12% respectively of the total assets of Uruguay’s financial system (Monje, 2009). 
Total assets of the registered banking system were USD 18.5 billion as at June 2009. 
The Uruguayan domestic market was the recipient of 71.2% of bank assets, with the 
non-financial sector the largest receiver of funds. On the other hand, the United States 
and European Union financial sectors were large recipients of the Uruguayan financial 
sector’s overseas investments, at 15.5% and 8.8% respectively (BCU, 2009c).  
 
The BCU only has reliable data sets pertaining to the public bank from June 2005 
onwards (BCU, 2009a). Therefore, most of the information employed regarding the 
Uruguayan banking system as a whole is from that date.  
 
Since late 2006, credit growth has accelerated, with credit to the non-financial sector 
growing by 50% in dollar terms from late 2006 to mid 2008. This expansion was 
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fuelled mainly by a growth in deposits, as well as banks increasing their portfolio 
allocations to the domestic credit market in preference to investments in foreign assets 
(IMF, 2009). As at mid-2009 the sum total of debt that the non-financial sector had 
with the wider banking system was split evenly between the public and private banks 
(52% and 48%, respectively). The total figure amounted to USD 7.5 billion, of which 
USD 1 billion was in arrears (Figure 1). The public banking system held 97% of debt 
in arrears, and the household and public sectors were responsible for 89% and 10% of 
impaired loans held by the public banking system (BCU, 2009a).  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009a) 
 
Figure 1: Total active and arrears debt held by Uruguayan private and public banks, from 2005 
to 2009  
 
While both private and public banks have expanded their credit operations, they have 
focused on different sectors (IMF, 2009; BCU, 2009a). The public banking sector 
(BHU excluded) has specialised in consumer loans, whereas the private banks have 
focused on corporate loans (Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009a) 
Figure 2: Debt held by the Uruguayan public banking system by economic sector, from 2005 to 
2009. 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009a) 
Figure 3: Debt held by the Uruguayan private banking system by economic sector, from 2005 to 
2009. 
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4.1.1.2 Historical Context 
 
4.1.1.2.1 Financial Crisis of 2002 
 
All of those interviewed agreed that the current state of the financial environment in 
Uruguay is a result of the financial crisis that occurred in the second half of 2002. 
What follows is a brief account of those events.  
 
On the back of three years of consecutive economic growth, Uruguay’s economy had 
gone into recession in 1999, with real GDP decreasing by 2.8%. This was due to 
international and domestic factors: Brazil devalued its currency, which eroded 
Uruguayan exports’ competitiveness; Argentina, another key trading partner was also 
experiencing a sharp recession; a decline in world prices for many of Uruguay’s 
commodity exports as well as an appreciation of the US dollar to which the 
Uruguayan peso was linked. On the domestic front a severe drought negatively 
impacted the agricultural sector. GDP continued to decline through 2000 and 2001 by 
1.4 and 3.4 percent respectively (Levy-Yeyati et al, 2004).  
 
Levy-Yeyati et al (2004) also mention that the real appreciation of the Uruguayan 
peso (and consequent loss of competitiveness of exports) led to a questioning of the 
prevailing crawling peg exchange rate regime, in which the currency had been 
devalued at predetermined monthly rates. This resulted in authorities first doubling 
the monthly rate of devaluation to 1.2%, and ultimately allowing the peso to float 
freely by mid 2002.  Deposits in Uruguayan banks by non-residents had grown 
steadily during 2001 as Argentinean depositors sought a “save haven” from adverse 
financial events in their own country. This tendency was reversed when Argentine 
authorities froze and “pesified” local deposits (a conversion of all US dollar deposits 
to Argentinean Pesos). With no access to their domestic savings accounts, 
Argentinean depositors quickly withdrew their savings from Uruguayan banks. 
Resident depositors eventually joined the run on the financial system. 
 
As a consequence of the bank runs and the devaluation of the peso, many banks were 
negatively impacted in regards to their solvency and some were suspended by the 
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BCU. Uruguay’s currency and country risks rose significantly, and the country’s 
investment rating was lowered. Eventually, aid from multilateral agencies (USD 1.5 
billion) funded a program that avoided a general freeze on deposits, as had occurred in 
Argentina (Levy-Yeyati et al, 2004). 
 
4.1.1.2.2 Historical context of Agricultural Finance in Uruguay 
 
During the 1980s the private banking sector’s participation in rural lending 
experienced a gradual reduction as a result of the financial crisis of 1982. 
Consequently, the BROU increased its level of involvement in the rural financing 
market (Picerno & Souto, 2005). In the 1990s, the private banks’ withdrawal from 
agricultural financing continued due, in part, to a reorientation of the banks’ lending 
priorities (shifting to growing consumer and international tourism sectors), as well as 
a perception of high risk of the agricultural sector (Nava, 2003). The latter was 
attributed to refinancing and debt restructuring, as well as a low repayment 
performance by the farming sector. As a result, the BROU, which provided 53% of 
the sector’s entire bank credit at the beginning of the decade, had its market share 
increase to 70% by 2001 (Arroyo, 2003). 
 
Total bank credit for agriculture during the 1990s experienced strong growth due to a 
series of factors. Among them was producers’ heightened confidence in the sector’s 
potential growth, and state-promoted policies aimed at stabilising the economy (Nava, 
2003). Another phenomenon observed during the 1990s was a progressive change in 
the currency in which loans were contracted. This led to practically all rural financing, 
from state and private banks alike, to be denominated in US dollars (Picerno & Souto, 
2005).  
 
The financial crisis of 2002 provoked a contraction in the availability of credit for the 
rural sector. Strengthening of Central Bank norms further constrained access to credit 
by downgrading many debtors’ risk profiles. A decline in confidence in the financial 
system also resulted in an increase of short term deposits, which further restricted the 
banks’ ability to provide long-term financing to the rural sector.  Due to these factors, 
growth in expenditure and investment by producers from 2002 onwards was largely 
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achieved via a low level of new debt incurred with the banking sector (Picerno & 
Souto, 2005). 
 
There was a clear shift from financing through banks to other sources, as there was 
virtually no access to bank credit during the years immediately following the 2002 
crisis. Some industries, either through national or foreign banks, increased their level 
of direct producer financing as part of either a competitive or supply-securing 
strategy. These included vertically integrated industries such as the malting barley and 
rice chains. As of 2005 the private banking sector slowly resumed its financing of 
farming activities, although it favoured short-term operations and was very selective 
with its portfolio (Picerno & Souto, 2005). Between 2005 and 2006 producers and 
other firms from the agricultural sector reduced their levels of debt, partly as a 
consequence of public policies, and partly due to improved market conditions 
(Buxedas, 2008). 
 
4.1.1.3 Financial Dollarization in Uruguay 
 
Uruguay operates a dual currency system in which individuals are legally allowed to 
run bank accounts and operate financially in either pesos or USD, although there have 
been government efforts to move away from the USD through monetary and tax 
policies. The use of the US dollar as a currency for doing business originated in the 
late 1970s due to exchange-rate and inflation instability. Uruguayans perceived the 
USD to be a safe-haven currency. It started out as a response to a low level of 
confidence in the peso and is now an aspect that is effectively ingrained in the 
national psyche (Source U13).  
 
Despite having one of the highest levels of financial dollarization in the world, the 
peso is still the basis for most transactions and contracts in the Uruguayan internal 
market (Piñón-Farah et al, 2008). An International Monetary Fund report on Uruguay 
(IMF, 2009) found that the share of USD-denominated credit fell from 65% in 2000 to 
58% in 2008. This was mostly as a result of the action of the public banking system, 
which reduced the dollarization of its activities from 50 to 32% over those years. The 
figure for the private banking establishment remained relatively constant at 80%. 
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When banks make USD-denominated loans to sectors of the economy whose incomes 
derive from the domestic market, they assume the risk that repayment could be 
impaired if the local currency were to devalue (BCU, 2009c).  
 
IMF (2009) also points out that there is a certain matching between the currency of 
approved loans and the source of borrowers’ income. This is supported by BCU 
(2009c) data, which mentions that the agriculture and manufacture industry sectors 
have the highest levels of USD debt (99% and 96%, respectively). Household credit 
has the lowest percentage, at 12%, whereas the rest of the sectors fluctuate between 
75% and 92%.  
 
As mentioned previously, the Peso/USD exchange rate was allowed to float freely in 
2002, after a decade under the crawling peg exchange rate regime. As a result, there is 
a clear before and after situation in exchange rate values (Figure 4). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from INE (2009a) 
Figure 4: Monthly Uruguayan peso to US dollar exchange rates, from 2000 to 2009. 
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4.1.1.4 Financial Indicators 
 
Uruguay’s inflation rate in pesos for 2009 is expected to be below 7% (BCU 2009d), 
coming down from 9.2% in 2008 and 8.5% in 2007. This would be the result of the 
implementation of anti-inflationary monetary policies, as well as a global recession 
that has slowed down the economy (Monje, 2009). Year on year inflation for June 
2009 was measured at 6.5%. However, these figures are far from those recorded 
during the 2002 financial crisis, in which the USD was allowed to float freely, and 
inflation reached over 28% before descending (Figure 5). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from INE (2009b). 
Figure 5: Uruguayan year-on-year inflation figures from 1998 to 2009. 
 
 
Term deposit interest rates for the first quarter of 2009 were 0.6% in US dollars and 
6.1% in Uruguayan pesos. Average loan rates were 6.0% and 17.7% for corporate 
loans in US dollars and pesos, respectively (BCU, 2009a). Along with inflation, rates 
in both currencies experienced surges during the 2002 financial crisis (Figure 6 and 
Figure 7) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009h) 
Figure 6: Uruguayan business loan and term deposit interest rates in Uruguayan pesos from 1998 
to 2009 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009h) 
Figure 7: Uruguayan business loan and term deposit interest rates in USD from 1998 to 2009. 
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Loan rates for agriculture have been historically higher than the average rates offered 
to the rest of the business sector, reflecting a higher perceived risk. However, the gap 
between these two rates has decreased in recent years (Figure 8). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009h) 
Figure 8: Average loan interest rates in USD for agricultural and all business, from 1998 to 2009. 
 
4.1.1.5 Country Credit Risk  
 
Uruguay’s foreign and domestic currency credit ratings are classified by Standard and 
Poor’s as BB- with a stable outlook (S&P, 2009b). Obligations with this rating face 
major exposure to business, financial or economic uncertainties. This can result in 
issuers of this type of debt being unable to meet their financial commitments to the 
holders of those obligations (S&P, 2009a).   
 
According to the ratings agency, a prudent macroeconomic management policy, 
combined with an improvement in the medium-term outlook of the Uruguayan 
economy due to a high level of foreign direct investment have not been enough to 
improve the current rating. This is attributed to high levels of government debt, 
expected to be around 45% of GDP by year-end 2009 (down from over 100% in 
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2003), a high level of financial dollarization, as well as a high level of exposure to 
adverse events in the region.  
 
4.1.1.6 Structure of Agricultural Financing 
 
Agricultural credit from the formal financial sector is done exclusively by the banking 
sector. This comprises the state-owned BROU as well as members of the private 
banking sector, which include Banco Santander (BS), Banco Itaú (BI), Nuevo Banco 
Comercial (NBC) and Crédit Uruguay (CU). All of the private banks, as mentioned 
earlier, are foreign-owned.  BS is owned by Grupo Santander of Spain, BI’s 
ownership is Brazilian, NBC’s ownership structure is a mix of American private 
equity firms and European investment and development funds, and CU is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Crédit Agricole of France.   
 
Credit to the agricultural sector has grown over the past few years, to over USD 840 
million in 2009. BROU holds approximately 40% of agricultural bank credit, with the 
remaining amount held by the private banking sector (BCU, 2009a). The level of debt 
in arrears held by the banking system as a whole has declined substantially in the 
period covered between 2005 and 2009. It descended from a high of 16% towards the 
end of 2005 (90% of which was held by BROU), to less than 1% in June 2009 (Figure 
9). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009a). 
Figure 9: Uruguayan active and arrears agricultural debt held by private and public banks, from 
2005 to 2009 
 
The BROU and the private banks cater differently to the agricultural sub-sectors’ 
credit demands (Figure 10 and Figure 11). Most noticeably, BROU has a larger 
presence in the rice cropping and dairy farming sectors; the private banks credit have 
a stronger presence in the forestry and cropping sectors (excluding rice).    
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Figure 10: Distribution of Uruguayan agricultural debt by sub-sectors within the public banking 
system, from 2005 to 2009. 
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Figure 11: Distribution of Uruguayan agricultural debt by sub-sectors within the private banking 
system, from 2005 to 2009. 
 
The agricultural sector’s level of debt with the banking sector escalated from US$ 305 
million (33% of sector GDP) in 1991 to US$ 1.23 billion (105% of sector GDP) by 
year end 1999 (Arroyo, 2003). Even though agricultural debt has grown in nominal 
terms in the past few years, its relation to sector GDP has reverted to a level more 
similar to that of the early 1990s, at 26% of agricultural GDP in 2008. Compared to 
the debt-to-GDP ratio of the whole economy, that of agriculture has been slightly 
higher in the past few years, though neither have surpassed 30% since 2005 (Figure 
12). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009a) and MGAP (2009). 
Figure 12: Uruguayan agricultural debt to agricultural GDP, and total debt to total GDP ratios 
from 2005 to 2008. 
 
Sourcing of funds for lending by the banking system is almost exclusively via the 
local deposit base (Sources U1, U2, U3, U5, U6), though overseas lines of credit and 
banks’ own capital were mentioned (Sources U2, U6, U10). This is attributable to the 
country’s credit rating, which prevents banks from accessing offshore financing at 
competitive rates. One other development from the 2002 crisis was that BCU has 
disallowed the use of foreign-owned deposits for lending purposes, further curtailing 
the pool of resources that banks can draw on to finance their lending activities (Source 
U4). All the above makes the cost of funds more transactional as it depends on the 
country’s cost of doing business (Source U3). 
 
A large proportion of agricultural credit is not recorded in official statistics, as it is 
provided from outside the financial system. In the years immediately following 2002, 
bank credit was virtually absent for the rural sector. Therefore, producers had to seek 
alternative financing sources in order to carry on with their farming activities, and 
make the most of (by then) booming agricultural commodities prices. Among those 
who finance agriculture from outside the financial sector are input providers, 
cooperatives of different kinds, some agricultural industries through vertical 
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coordination strategies, traders, pension funds, and private capital placements 
(Sources U12, U13).  
 
4.1.2 Regulatory Environment  
 
4.1.2.1 Capital Adequacy 
 
An adequate level of capital holdings within a banking system can serve as a buffer 
against losses due to unexpected shocks. All banks hold some level of capital, though 
prior to 1988 there was no international regulatory standard that set capital 
requirements (Yeh et al, 2005).  
 
The Basel Capital Accord, also known as Basel I, was developed in 1988 by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. It was designed as a way in which to have a 
more accurate measurement of capital and to link it to the main types of risk that 
banking entities face (BCU, 2009b). Basel I designated types of capital that could be 
held by banks as Tier 1 and Tier 2, according to the loss-absorbing characteristics. 
Tier 1 is the highest ranking in this respect. 
 
Tier 1 capital can include common stock and retained earnings, and can buffer 
unexpected losses up to a certain level without disrupting trading. On the other hand, 
Tier 2 capital, such as subordinated debt (a loan that ranks below other loans with 
regards to claims from creditors in case of default), has no loss-absorbing properties. 
However, in the event of bank failure it can provide some protection to depositors 
(Yeh et al, 2005). Loan-loss provisions are not included in Tier 2 capital so they do 
not contribute towards capital held by banks (Adler et al, 2009).  
 
Basel I also requires that capital be held by banks in relation to the risks they face. 
Minimum capital requirements as a percentage of assets are calculated, and are 
adjusted using risk weights. Corporate loans are riskier and are assigned higher 
weights, whereas lower weights are assigned to lower risk assets, such as government 
exposures. The minimum total capital required by Basel I is 8% of total risk weighted 
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assets, of which at least half has to be Tier 1 (Yeh et al, 2005). The average level of 
risk-weighted capital held by the Uruguayan banking system at the end of the first 
quarter of 2009 was 2.2 times the minimum level required by BCU regulations (BCU, 
2009c). 
 
Stress testing results showed this to be a good level of solvency. Stress tests aim to 
estimate the possible impact that adverse macroeconomic scenarios could have on 
financial entities’ solvency, in order to anticipate possible problems. The 
methodology used seeks to measure the impact that changes in key variables would 
have on banks’ balance sheets. The variables used include exchange rates, inflation, 
international interest rates, country credit risk and level of loan delinquency (BCU, 
2009b). As an added element to solvency, banks have implemented a loan-loss 
provision fund as required by BCU, which acts as an aid for meeting any problems 
regarding distressed or defaulted loans without having to resort to additional capital. 
 
Uruguay’s financial system is currently working under the Basel I framework. The 
move to a new capital framework embodied by Basel II was approved in 2004, and 
will be implemented in gradual steps between 2009/10 and 2013/14 (BCU, 2009e).  
 
The Basel II framework is based on a three-pillar approach. The first pillar defines 
guidelines for capital requirements according to credit, market and operational risks. It 
also establishes modelling procedures that can either be standard or complex and 
internally developed by the financial entities themselves. Pillar 2 gives the supervising 
entity the authority to request additional capital for risks that are considered not to be 
covered in Pillar 1. The final pillar establishes disclosure mechanisms that are 
considered fundamental to the promotion of market transparency (BCU, 2009e).  
 
4.1.2.2 Loan-loss provisioning 
 
Among the BCU’s regulations that affect the cost and access to credit is the imposed 
loan-loss provisioning regime (Sources U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6). Loan-loss 
provisions, as defined by IMF (2004) are net allowances that deposit takers (i.e. 
financial entities) make for expected losses from bad or impaired loans. If a client is 
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categorised as risky, then the bank must set aside capital to cover expected losses. 
Capital set aside for provisioning doesn’t generate interest, which entails an additional 
cost that is shouldered by banks (Source U2). As the level of provisioning increases 
with risk, so do the risk premiums, and therefore the overall interest rates offered to 
clients.  
 
Table 5: Loan-loss provisioning schedule for the Uruguayan financial system regarding 
commercial, consumer and housing portfolios regarding.  
 
Category Characteristics Provision (as % of loan) 
1A Fully-backed operations  0% 
1C Clients with strong repayment ability 0.5% to 3% 
2A Clients with an adequate repayment ability 3% to 7% 
2B 
Clients with potential problems with regards to 
repayment ability 7% to 20% 
3 Clients with compromised repayment ability 20% to 50% 
4 Clients with very compromised repayment ability 50% to 100% 
5 Clients with unrecoverable debt 100% 
 
Source: BCU, 2006a 
 
The level of provisions made depends on the likelihood of losses occurring (Table 5). 
In order to assess this likelihood, banks are required by BCU to provide each lending 
file with a credit rating in order to determine its default risk. As a result, the level of 
provisioning is made according to clients’ final credit rating, which in turn is based on 
the information contained in lending files (Sources U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6).  
 
The information to be included in lending files, as per BCU requirements (BCU, 
2006b), should be as follows: 
 
• Identification data:  
 
Basic information on the client (name, address, type of activity and legal status 
of the business), history of the client’s relationship with the bank, and name of 
the financial officer responsible of the account.  
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• Risk Assessment:  
 
Includes an evaluation of the client’s risk exposure, level of provisioning made 
as well as quantifiable collateral taken by the bank. Reporting on these should 
be done on a monthly basis. There should also be an assessment on the client’s 
repayment capability and if they have performed well in the past regarding 
repayments.  
 
• Information required for assessment of borrowers’ repayment capability: 
 
Historical financial documentation, which includes balance sheets, budgets and 
cash flows, as well as sworn statements of financial position. All financial 
information has to be audited and accompanied by the relevant contract between 
the auditor and the client, as well as the auditor’s curriculum vitae. The banks 
may request up to the last three sets of accounts in order to assess the evolution 
of equity, as well as the level of income that will be available to service debt 
(Sources U4, U5). In addition to the historical information, a lending file must 
contain information which includes projected cash flows and budgets as well as 
the projected financial position of the business at the conclusion of the loan term 
(Sources U4, U5).  
 
Other requirements include a set of documents that certify that the client is up to 
date with payments to the tax and social security departments, as well as the 
regional and/or city council, and a sworn statement with DICOSE, a 
government department which monitors numbers and movements of livestock in 
the country (Sources U1, U2, U6).  
 
There is also an assessment of the personal factor of clients, which constitutes a 
subjective classification. This is achieved by means of farm property visits by 
bank technical staff (generally agronomists or agricultural veterinarians). These 
visits are intended to gauge how farmers operate, if they possess the necessary 
farming skills to meet their debt servicing obligations, and if they are perceived 
to be of sound moral character (Sources U1, U3, U4, U5, U6).  
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• Information on securities: 
 
The level and type of assets put up as collateral are also influential in the final 
level of loan-loss provisioning that banks need. BCU determines what assets 
can constitute collateral, and furthermore makes a distinction between what are 
termed “Quantifiable” and “Non-Quantifiable” collateral (BCU, 2005).  
 
Those assets considered as “Quantifiable” by BCU can serve as a means to 
reduce the level of capital put aside as provisions. The main condition that these 
assets have to comply with in order to be considered is that they are relatively 
easily realisable. Assets classified as “Quantifiable” collateral include cash 
deposits, Uruguayan sovereign debt, merchandise, mortgaged real estate, some 
categories of vehicles and agricultural machinery, and livestock, among others 
(BCU, 2005). Grain warranting is one tool that was mentioned by many of those 
interviewed as a recent innovative tool, which consists of security being taken 
over grain that is in storage in approved locations (Sources U2, U4, U5, U6). If 
it is not on the list of assets that are classified as “Quantifiable”, then it is 
classed by default as “Non-Quantifiable”, and consequently cannot be used as a 
means to reduce provisioning.  
 
BCU actions in this area also include determining the scaling of securities (i.e. 
the percentage of asset values that can be taken as collateral) as well as auditing 
the valuation process of securities. It was noted by interviewees that banks are 
allowed by BCU to take either type of collateral, but they will prefer to take 
security on as much of the “Quantifiable” type. The objective of this is to reduce 
the level of capital to be set aside as provisions, and consequently the final 
interest rate offered to the client (Sources U1, U2).  
 
Once all of the above items required in the lending file are accounted for, a client can 
be given a credit rating, which is reviewed on an annual basis. Apart from internal 
auditing procedures, BCU audits banks’ lending portfolios yearly in order to ascertain 
that BCU norms are complied with, that the correct categories have been assigned to 
all files, and that the correct level of provisioning has been made. BCU is extremely 
strict when enforcing the regulations regarding credit rating of clients, and the absence 
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of any documentation can affect the final credit rating of a client (Sources U1, U2, 
U4, U5, U6).  
 
Banking institutions are rated by BCU according to the level of risk assumed in their 
lending portfolios. This is why, in reality, banks’ lending portfolios will be comprised 
of mostly clients with credit ratings in groups 1 and 2. Some clients with a credit 
rating of 3 may be considered if the loan officer considers that it is solely a minor 
documentation issue and that the level and quality of securities offered is good 
(Sources U2, U4) . Individuals categorised as 4 and 5 aren’t financed by the banking 
system as, apart from the implied risk, it proves to be too expensive an exercise 
(Sources U2, U6). By mid-2009, the level of provisioning in the Uruguayan banking 
system was the equivalent to over six times the level of non-performing loans (Figure 
13). 
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Figure 13: Uruguayan Bank Provisioning 
 
BCU established a comprehensive credit bureau in 2003 into which all banks must 
feed the information on debtors’ credit ratings and the consolidated loan amounts that 
individuals have with the banking system (Adler et al, 2009). This information 
becomes available for consultation to the rest of the banking system through BCU. 
This level of disclosure is seen by some of those interviewed as onerous but at the 
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same time a good framework to work in, as it enables banks to lend more securely 
(Sources U1, U3, U4, U6, U17).  
 
4.1.2.3 Required reserve ratio 
 
BCU’s Required Reserve Ratio (RRR) has also been a factor mentioned by those 
interviewed as one that influences the cost of credit (Sources U4, U5, U6, U10, U12). 
RRR is a percentage of cash deposits that has to be held as liquid reserves, either in a 
bank vault or in a central bank, and is statutorily enforced. Its purpose is to satisfy 
withdrawal demands, although the RRR can be used as well as a tool in a country’s 
monetary policy by reducing or increasing the supply of money.  
 
In Uruguay’s dual-currency system the ratio is different for deposits in Uruguayan 
pesos and for those using foreign currencies (i.e. US dollars). As of May 2008, BCU 
raised the RRR from 17% to 20% for deposits made in Uruguayan pesos, and from 25 
to 30% for deposits made in foreign currencies. Interest payments made on reserves 
deposited with BCU were also temporarily suspended (Presidencia, 2009; BCU, 
2008). This was done partly as an attempt to reduce the level of dollarization of the 
economy, but more importantly as an anti-inflationary policy (Source U13).  
 
The reserve requirement is a factor that increases the cost of credit. This is because 
after the required reserves have been deposited with BCU, what is left of deposited 
funds must be sufficient to pay an interest rate on that deposit as well as lend to clients 
(Source U5).  
 
4.1.2.4 Issues with the regulatory system 
 
The high level of oversight and control that BCU has over the Uruguayan financial 
system is a result of the financial crisis of 2002, as debt was previously classified as 
active or in arrears. Provisioning was made for what was overdue. The credit rating 
system used to be simpler, with categories ranging from 1 to 5, and no sub-
categorisation (Source U2). This is why, in spite of the stringency of the current 
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system, those interviewed from within the banking system find that it is also a good 
framework within which to work, and that a tighter set of rules compared to what was 
in place 10 years ago was in order. The level of information available on clients due to 
BCU’s information system is also seen as a positive aspect of the current system 
(Sources U1, U3, U4, U6, U17). 
 
There is a general consensus among those interviewed that due to the amount of due 
diligence and paperwork that loan officers have to complete in order to provide a 
client with a credit rating, the current regulatory environment can be restrictive to the 
access of credit (Sources U2, U5). Much of the information required by the BCU 
requires good financial records, which necessarily need to be processed by 
accountants. Larger firms tend to have their books kept by accountants, but proper 
book-keeping may be an issue for smaller, geographically-dispersed farmers, which 
makes access to credit at a reasonable cost a problem for that market segment 
(Sources U3, U5, U13).  
 
Another issue is that the amount of restrictions also works in private banks’ favour as 
they can cherry-pick the best clients in the marketplace (Sources U1, U3, U6, U12). 
On the other hand, as BROU is a state-owned entity, it has to cater to a wider 
spectrum of clientele and accommodate those that don’t reach the ideal standards set 
by BCU (Source U1).  
 
Informal finance providers are not directly regulated by BCU (Sources U1, U15). 
However, those who provide finance from outside the financial system still source 
much of their funding from the banking sector, so that their financing activities to a 
certain extent reflect the regulatory actions of BCU (Source U15).   
 
As far as any of the interviewees from the banking sector are concerned, there are no 
restrictions on interest rates and term durations, and no specific regulations regarding 
agricultural lending. What has happened relative to agriculture is that BCU has had 
that sector modify its accounting practices so that they have converged to the common 
practices of the wider commercial sector (Source U4; BCU, 2006b).  
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4.1.3 Supply of Agricultural Finance 
 
4.1.3.1 Banking Sector 
 
4.1.3.1.1 Approval for credit 
 
The steps that banks have to take, as well as the information required from clients to 
grant approval for loans are standard, BCU-prescribed procedures, as described 
previously. Farmer capabilities and the financial viability of all types of loans are 
assessed when assembling the lending file and establishing clients’ credit ratings. 
 
4.1.3.1.2 Monitoring 
 
Once clients are provided with a loan, the level of monitoring to which they are 
subjected depends on the quality of the client, as inferred from information in the loan 
file, as well as the purpose of the funds and the length of the term (Sources U1, U6).   
Loan officers would ideally check on the repayment status of their clients and those 
who were not performing adequately would be monitored more closely. Otherwise, in 
the case of adequately-performing loans, there are only a few instances of contact 
between clients and loan officers during the course of a year (Sources U4, U5, U6). 
Having good relationships with clients was also mentioned as an important factor that 
helps reduce the need for close monitoring, as there is a more profound knowledge of 
the people the banks go into business with (Sources U1, U3, U4, U5). 
 
Even though interviewees found that the legal system works effectively, the recovery 
of securities can be a long and complicated process, and sometimes counter-
productive (Sources U2, U3, U10). This is why every attempt is made to rehabilitate 
accounts in distress, rather than letting them go into arrears. Interviewees stated 
clearly that taking ownership of securities is a last resort action, and that every effort 
is made to refinance first (Sources U2, U3, U6).  
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4.1.3.1.3 Lending for farm purchase 
 
The banking system was found to be the only source of long-term capital available for 
land purchase. There are, however, differences in how the public and private sectors 
approach this type of financing.  
 
BROU will normally finance up to 50% of the value of land and for a term length of 
up to 10 years. In the case of smallholders, who have limited savings ability, but a 
higher capacity for work, the bank can extend these limits to 70-80% of the value of 
land acquired, with terms of up to 12 years (Sources U1, U2).   
 
In the private banking sector farm purchase finance is a bit more varied, as each bank 
has its own criteria for this type of finance. One bank has no set percentage up to 
which it goes when financing land acquisition, as it depends on individual clients 
(Source U3). The other private banks finance between 50 and 70% of the value of 
land. (Sources U4, U5, U6).  Term lengths for these operations are between 5 and 7 
years .  
 
Interest rates offered to clients have a risk premium component, associated with 
clients’ credit rating, as well as a term premium. The higher the implied risk of a 
given client, and the longer the term of the loan, the higher the premiums, and 
consequently the overall interest rates charged. There are no set rates for land-
acquisition operations, as they are determined on a per-client basis (Sources U1, U2, 
U3, U4, U6). However, interviewees stated that interest rates could be placed between 
7 and 9%, usually using variable rates (Sources U1, U2, U3, U5, U6). The base rate 
used in Uruguay when using variable rates is the London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR) (Sources U3, U4, U5).  
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4.1.3.1.3.1 Criteria 
 
Interviewees stated that they almost exclusively tend to finance land purchase to 
individuals who are already in farming and have proven that they have a real need to 
expand. Financing the acquisition of land is done only when there is a solid business 
plan behind it (Sources U1, U5, U6).  
 
The only kind of security that any of the banks take for this type of lending is a 
mortgage over land (Sources U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6). Registering a mortgage in 
Uruguay always requires the employment of a notary public. The notary public 
ensures that everything is in order with regards to the property title, and essentially 
makes sure there are no outstanding claims or embargoes on that property from any 
public or private parties. The cost of a mortgage, which includes various tributes and 
rates, the notary public’s fees (generally 3%), and the cost of registering the mortgage 
itself, amounts to around 4.5% of the value of the mortgage (Source U18).  
 
4.1.3.1.4 Lending for development 
 
Credit for farm development was hardly mentioned in detail, though it is categorised 
by banks as long term lending. As such, term-lengths and interest rates for 
development projects, which include irrigation schemes or large infrastructure such as 
feedlots or grain silos, are much the same as for land acquisition (Source U2). 
Mortgages are generally used for securing large volume and/or long term lending 
(Source U3).  
 
4.1.3.1.5 Medium-term lending 
 
Medium-term lending refers to loans for durations of up to 4 or 5 years, and the banks 
provide it for financing of plant, machinery, pastures and livestock (Sources U1, U2, 
U3, U4, U5, U6). As in long-term lending, the main sources of finance in this case are 
within the banking system. There are no notable differences between the private and 
public banks as to how they approach this type of financing.  
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Farm plant and machinery, as well as utility vehicle finance can be carried out through 
the provision of credit for purchases or for leases. In the case of purchases, banks will 
finance up to a certain percentage of the value of the machinery or vehicle for terms 
of up to 5 years (Sources U1, U4, U6). On the other hand, lease agreements can 
legally run for terms between 3 and 5 years (Sources U4, U6).  
 
Credit for livestock also falls within this category. The category and type of livestock 
financed can determine the term length, repayment structure, and whether or not there 
are leniency periods in that facility (Sources U2, U3, U6). 
 
Medium term lending has a smaller term premium than long term lending (Source 
U2). Risk premiums remain unchanged with regards to term length, and are therefore 
determined according to the credit rating of the lending files, as explained previously. 
Interest rates charged are around 8% (Sources U2, U3, U5). 
 
4.1.3.1.5.1 Criteria 
 
The cropping sector has a high level of demand for machinery finance, as does the 
dairy sector, which additionally requires finance for dairy equipment (Sources U1, 
U2). In this type of financing, the assets that are financed are themselves used as 
collateral (Sources U3, U4, U5, U6).  
 
4.1.3.1.6 Short-term Lending 
 
Short-term capital refers to loans with maturities of less than one year, or thereabouts. 
Both the private banks and BROU provide a wide range of short term financing, 
which includes seasonal working capital, revolving capital and/or overdraft facilities, 
advances on sales and document discounting (Sources U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6).  
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Short term lending involves no term premium, so the final interest rates charged 
depend more on individual clients’ credit ratings (Source U2). Annual interest rates, 
according to those interviewed, are between 5.5 and 8% (Sources U1, U2, U3, U5, 
U6).  
 
4.1.3.1.6.1 Criteria 
 
Seasonal working capital is highly demanded by the cropping and dairy sectors. Dairy 
farmers’ needs revolve around feed procurement (Sources U1, U2), whereas those 
dedicated to cropping need seasonal capital for bulky inputs such as fertiliser, seed, 
fuel or other agri-chemicals (Sources U1, U2, U5, U6). Securities used for seasonal 
capital for cropping include warrants on stored grain, tendering collection rights on 
forward contracts on grain, or the crop itself as collateral (Sources U2, U4, U5, U6). 
 
Beef farmers’ needs tend more towards advances on sales and document discounting 
of cheques from the meat industry. In this operation the bank can buy a cheque that 
has a deferred payment date of 60 or 90 days, for instance, and pays the seller the 
value of that cheque at a discounted rate (Sources U2, U4, U6) . Farmers in the beef 
sector are also beginning to need larger amounts of working capital for feed, as their 
farming practices are progressively becoming more intensive (Sources U1, U2, U4) .  
 
4.1.3.2 The Non-Banking Sector 
 
The interviews with non-bank suppliers of agricultural finance attempted to capture a 
cross-section of the relevant players in this area in order to obtain some insight into 
how this segment of agricultural finance operates.  
 
4.1.3.2.1 Fertiliser companies 
 
In the years immediately following the crisis, bank finance of any type was extremely 
hard to come by for a good proportion of farmers (Sources U12, U13). This promoted 
the growth of direct financing from input suppliers, as their financing packages 
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become more attractive to clients (Sources U15, U16). This was due to them not 
having the rigidity that the banks had regarding conditions of access to credit (Sources 
U12, U17).  
 
Sales representatives from two fertiliser companies in Uruguay were interviewed to 
provide insights regarding financial assistance coming from this sector. Fertiliser 
companies had some degree of involvement in financing production prior to the 2002 
financial crisis, providing finance or deferred payments to clients based on their past 
dealings with them. They stated that the cost of finance is contingent on the client, as 
well as the term and volume of the loan. Interest rates charged could therefore range 
between 7.5 and 13%. Sourcing of funds for input suppliers is mostly drawn from the 
banking system (private and public), their own suppliers, and the companies’ own 
private funds (Sources U15, U16). 
 
4.1.3.2.1.1 Criteria  
 
Fertiliser companies do not usually finance producers directly, unless the scale of a 
particular operation may warrant doing so. They would rely on information from their 
distributors, as well as credit checks with the wider financial and commercial sectors.   
 
When financing cropping, payment is arranged for after harvest. Regarding the type 
of security required, the most common guarantee in use is for farmers to cede 
payment rights on forward contracts for grain that have been negotiated with 
exporters or grain mills. In contrast, dairy farmers tend to negotiate monthly 
instalment plans, with processing companies acting as retaining agents for 
repayments. Sheep and beef farmers use very short term financing, usually for less 
than 6 months (Sources U15, U16).  
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4.1.3.2.2 Industry 
 
There are two industrial complexes that provide direct finance to farmers within their 
sectors as part of their procurement strategies. These are the rice-milling and the malt 
barley processing industries, which supply producers with working capital for the 
seasonal cost of cropping (Sources U1, U14). An interview was only secured with a 
representative from the malt barley industry.  
 
Prior to 2002, BROU used to be a provider of capital for approximately 80% of the 
rice cropping area. It now provides 30% of the sector’s financial needs. In the current 
scenario, the industry provides most of the seasonal capital demanded by rice farmers, 
whereas the banking sector’s role has been relegated to providing mainly medium and 
long term finance for machinery and infrastructure (Source U1). 
 
During the 1990s and up until 2002 the malting industry provided financing for 100% 
of the seasonal costs of barley cropping. Currently, the level of financing supplied by 
the industry can be up to 50 or 60% of seasonal working capital. The informant stated 
that all finance provided is for seasonal capital only, and that interest rates charged to 
farmers are between 10 and 12% per annum (Source U14).  
 
Funding for financing activities of the malting companies and rice mills is done by 
channelling finance from either the banks (Sources U1, U14) or through open lines of 
credit with the input suppliers themselves (Source U14, U16).   
 
4.1.3.2.2.1 Criteria 
 
There is a closer evaluation today of producers in the malting barley sector, who now 
are provided with a smaller percentage of financing than in the past. This is seen as a 
positive aspect as producers are more financially stable and they no longer rely on the 
company for all their seasonal capital needs (Source U14). 
 
Repayment is agreed to be made after harvest, and it is extremely rare for producers to 
default on loans. The reason for this is that in exchange for credit, producers sign over 
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payment rights to the malting company so that it can be reimbursed for any amounts 
outstanding. Risk is also mitigated by requiring producers to insure their crops and 
having them sign over payment rights on these insurance policies to the company 
(Source U14).  
 
4.1.3.2.3 Cooperatives 
 
Cooperatives also have a tradition of supplying their members with financial 
assistance, though the financial footing on which the different co-ops themselves 
stand, as well as the productive orientation of their member-patrons is influential on 
how financing is arranged (Sources U8, U9, U10, U11). Managers of three large 
cooperatives were interviewed: Copagran, whose members are mostly involved in 
cropping or a mix of cropping and meat production; Conaprole, the country’s largest 
dairy cooperative and dairy processing company; Central Lanera Uruguaya (CLU), a 
second-degree cooperative (an association of cooperatives and rural promotion 
societies) specialising in procuring, processing and exporting wool, as well as 
facilitating supply of heavy lambs to the meat industry.  
 
The co-ops have different ways of approaching the provision of finance, though the 
provision of finance is not the core business of the cooperatives; it is a service to their 
members, who need credit in order to function (Sources U8, U9, U10).  
 
4.1.3.2.3.1 Copagran 
 
Copagran has had no direct access to bank finance since 2000 as it is still working on 
improving its credit rating within the banking system due to high levels of debt. Prior 
to this, the co-op acted as a second tier bank, channelling and managing bank credit to 
its members. The same sort of model is still in place today, with the co-op channelling 
credit from input suppliers for the most part, but also from members who deposit 
funds with the Copagran at better rates than the banks (Source U8).  
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Most of Copagran’s financing resources go towards cropping-related activities. The 
dairy sector was also mentioned as requiring credit from the co-op.  Interest rates 
when financing through Copagran are between 9 and 11% (Source U8).  
 
4.1.3.2.3.1.1 Criteria 
 
In order to access financing through the co-op, producers have to be members. Prior 
knowledge of how a producer works also enters the equation. Producers are also 
charged a technical assistance fee for an agronomist, who authorises the inputs 
financed to be released when deemed necessary (Source U8). 
 
Collateral used in the case of cropping is the crop itself. Co-op members are also 
required to insure their crops and have a contract that commits their production to the 
co-op in order to be eligible for seasonal finance for cropping. In the case of dairy 
producers, the dairy processing industry acts as a payment retaining agent, therefore 
guaranteeing repayment to the co-op (Source U8).  
 
4.1.3.2.3.2 Conaprole 
 
Conaprole finances farmers through its input supplying branch, Prolesa, which 
channels finance from input suppliers to producers (Sources U10, U11). The co-op 
used to directly finance Prolesa’s activities, but as it started issuing debentures as a 
capital-raising mechanism, it is not allowed to directly finance its input supplying arm 
(Source U11). Conaprole also organises mid and long-term finance for their smaller 
producers through Proleco, a finance co-op which functions under BCU norms 
(Sources U10, U11). Proleco sources funds from the National Development 
Corporation at a cost of 6%.  
 
Producers draw inputs from Prolesa on credit at a cost of between 8 and 10%. Those 
who finance through Proleco pay 9% interest (Sources U10, U11).  
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4.1.3.2.3.2.1 Criteria 
 
Conaprole retains payment for inputs from monthly payments. In this way, the co-op 
can monitor how much financial assistance producers are taking compared to their 
incomes. This aspect aids in tidying producers’ financial management, as those who 
draw too many inputs in relation to their milk production are eventually cut off.  
 
4.1.3.2.3.3 Central Lanera Uruguaya  
 
CLU’s procurement of wool and lamb is done entirely through the use of forward 
contracting, which works by producers pledging their future production months in 
advance. Sourcing of funds for CLU’s financing activities is varied. The most 
important source is a short-term line of credit from BROU which is securitised using 
CLU’s real assets, such as wool in storage. Other sources include debentures and 
offshore credit from Oikocredit, a Dutch development bank, as well as advances that 
are unclaimed by producers and are left as an investment in the co-op. Credit lines 
from the private banks are used, but sparingly, as they aren’t able to match the interest 
rates charged by BROU (Source U9).  
 
The amount advanced and the interest charged depends on producers’ past dealings 
with the co-op. Generally speaking though, CLU can advance up to 50% of the value 
of farmers’ production at an average annual cost of 8% interest.  
 
CLU also has credit lines called “special advances” that can be used to cover medium-
term investments, for which the co-op charges annual interest rates of 9 to 10%. There 
are also specific financing plans for medium term investments such as pastures for 
lamb production, which are coordinated but not funded by CLU. In these cases CLU 
acts only as a retaining agent for repayments to the banks involved. 
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4.1.3.2.3.3.1 Criteria 
 
Financing of producers is usually unsecured. Therefore, CLU relies on the 
information provided by the cooperatives that producers are members of, or do 
business with. The amount advanced, and the interest rate charged depends on how 
long a producer has been involved with CLU. As a normal precaution, technical staff 
from CLU visits producers before and after signing with them. However, advances of 
over USD 20,000 require assurances that the recipient of funds is financially solvent. 
 
4.1.3.3 Issues with the supply of credit 
 
An issue that was mentioned repeatedly by non-bank interviewees was in relation to 
the high cost structure of the banking system. Specifically, the main issue was the 
high level of employed labour in the banking sector as a whole. Those who stated this 
as an issue believe that the reason behind this is the strong bankers’ union which 
needs to keep a high level of employment in the sector in order to support the 
bankers’ retirement fund (Sources U9, U10, U17).  
 
Producers who opt for credit from non-bank sources do so because it is less 
cumbersome in terms of the paperwork and is less time-consuming in its approval 
process. This is in spite of it being more expensive than through the banking system 
(Sources U8, U9, U10, U12, U14, U16, U17). A loss of confidence in the banking 
system was also mentioned as a contributing factor (Sources U10, U16).  
 
Access to long term and/or high volume credit is hindered by the high cost of 
registering the mortgages required to secure such financing which is added to the 
actual cost of the loans (Sources U2, U10). The use of a mortgaged property as 
collateral is a last resort alternative, as producers guard their assets due to a sense of 
mistrust towards the banking system that is a remnant of the 2002 crisis (Sources U10, 
12). The limited term length of long-term finance is also seen as a factor that 
negatively affects the employment of this type of funding (Source U10).  
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With regards to access, the private banks acknowledge that they are not in the best 
position to aid the lower socio-economic echelons of farmers, due to the small number 
of branch offices that they have in the country. They recognise that this is the domain 
of BROU, which has an extensive network of branches all over the country. The dairy 
sector is a point in case, as it is very geographically dispersed with a large number of 
smallholders. This has made the private banks, by their own admission, move away 
from this sector. However, they do seek out the larger dairy operations (Sources U3, 
U4). BROU therefore caters largely to the small and medium enterprises in this sector, 
using the advantage of its nationwide network of branch offices (Sources U1, U4, 
U6).  
 
Another issue is the limited scope of financial tools for channelling national savings 
into the agricultural sector, apart from the banking sector and a few isolated cases of 
debentures from agribusiness firms (Sources U8, U12, U13).  
 
A final point that bears mentioning as an issue is that informants perceive that there is 
still a lack of financial literacy in a large part of rural clients. Many of the recent 
positive changes in how business plans are carried out have not been as a result of 
forward-planning and visualisation of where the business manager wanted the firm to 
be in the long term. Credit has more often been used as a fix or last resort, and not as a 
tool (Sources U1, U10, U11).  
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4.2 New Zealand  
 
4.2.1 Macro Environment 
 
4.2.1.1 Structure of New Zealand’s financial sector 
 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was established in 1934 and is New Zealand’s 
central bank. Its main functions, described in the Reserve Bank Act of 1989, include operating 
monetary policy to maintain price stability, promoting the maintenance of a sound and 
efficient financial system, and meeting the currency needs of the public. The RBNZ carries 
out its functions through certain actions (RBNZ, 2009h). They are as follows: 
 
• Formulating and implementing monetary policy.  
• Registering and monitoring banks, and requiring banks to meet certain criteria.  
• Regulating non-bank deposit takers.  
• Monitoring the financial system for stability.  
• Providing banking services to the banks, which make payments to each other through 
‘settlement accounts’ at the Reserve Bank. Some banking services are also provided to 
government.  
• Holding and managing New Zealand’s foreign exchange reserves.  
• Issuing New Zealand bank notes and coins. 
 
The New Zealand financial system encompasses a variety of financial institutions, some of 
which provide broad-based financial services and others that are more niche-oriented. The 
dominant category comprises those that source funding via retail and/or wholesale sources, 
such as registered banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). The latter include 
finance companies and building societies. Other participants in the financial sector include 
unit trusts and other group investment funds, superannuation schemes, and insurance 
companies (Mortlock, 2003).  
 
The registered banks manage the largest proportion of deposit taking and lending, with an 
asset-base of NZD 383 billion. On the liabilities side, non-residents account for approximately 
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40% of total NZD and foreign currency liabilities (NZD 125 billion out of NZD 320 billion), 
or one third of total liabilities (RBNZ, 2009f). The NBFIs have an asset-base of NZD 21 
billion. Similarly to the banks, one third of total liabilities correspond to non-resident funding 
(RBNZ, 2009g). 
 
There are 19 registered banks in New Zealand as at September 2009 (RBNZ, 2009e), and all 
but three are subsidiaries or branches of foreign-owned banks. The five largest banks are 
Australian-owned, and they concentrate between them over 85% of banking system assets 
(ANZ, 2009; ASB; 2009; BNZ, 2009; Westpac, 2009). 
  
The total level of credit to the non-financial sector increased threefold in the past decade, 
from NZD 100 billion in 1998, to just over NZD 301 billion in 2009 (Figure 14). However, 
the growth was not uniform for all sectors. While household credit (which comprises housing 
and consumer loans) tripled in magnitude, and business credit did so by a factor of 2.6, 
agricultural credit more than quadrupled its volume in the period considered. Household 
credit represented 59% of total debt in 2009, business credit 26%, and agricultural loans 15% 
(RBNZ, 2009d).  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from RBNZ (2009d) 
Figure 14: Level of credit to the New Zealand non-financial sector from 1998 to 2009 by sub-sector. 
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4.2.1.2 Financial Indicators 
 
Inflation has averaged 2.5% since 1990 (Figure 15), which is a substantial reduction from the 
12% in the 1970s and 11% in the 1980s (RBNZ, 2009i). Annual inflation had reached 4% in 
June 2006 because of surging oil prices, but fell to 1.8% in September 2007 due to a 
combination of a reduction in petrol prices and government intervention in other areas of the 
economy. Sharp increases in international prices of oil and food led to annualised inflation 
peaking at 5.1% in September 2008, with a fall to 3.4% in December of that year, and further 
falls to around 1% expected in 2009 (Treasury, 2009a).  
 
 
 
Source: RBNZ (2009i) 
Figure 15: New Zealand inflation figures from 1990 to 2009. 
 
 
In the wider financial system nominal interest rates averaged 3.9% for deposits, and 10.4% for 
loans in the first quarter of 2009 (Figure 16). This is a notable decrease from twelve months 
prior to that, where those rates reached 8.2 and 12.1% for deposits and loans, respectively 
(EIU, 2009).  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from RBNZ (2009h) 
Figure 16: New Zealand business loan and term deposit interest rates from 1988 to 2009. 
 
4.2.1.3 Country credit risk 
 
The magnitude and maturity structure of New Zealand banks’ foreign borrowing leaves them 
vulnerable to any disruption to the inflow of this type of capital. Over the past five or six 
years, New Zealand banks have relied on foreign capital for approximately one-third of their 
funding, of which two-thirds mature in terms of less than a year (IMF, 2009). The ability of 
banks to roll over their funding depends not only on the quality of their loan portfolios, credit 
ratings and overall financial health, but also on global financial conditions. An increase in 
spreads on foreign funding, particularly on medium term lending, made access to financing in 
the medium term more difficult as of December 2008.  
 
Nonetheless, this was offset by a reduction in foreign and international deposit interest rates, 
which led to a reduction in the funding costs for New Zealand banks. Retail deposit and 
wholesale funding guarantee schemes introduced by the government in late 2008 helped 
reduce funding pressures on banks (IMF, 2009).  These schemes have enabled banks to use, at 
a cost, the New Zealand sovereign credit rating to access international credit markets.  
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According to the New Zealand Debt Management Office (NZDMO, 2009) both Standard and 
Poor’s, and Moody’s Investors Service credit rating agencies classify New Zealand’s foreign 
and domestic currency credit ratings as AA+ and Aaa, respectively, with a stable outlook, 
whereas Fitch Ratings classifies these as AA+ re-affirmed with a negative outlook. 
Deterioration in the credit rating of New Zealand’s sovereign debt can have the effect of 
increasing the interest rate at which banks can borrow funds from overseas. The AA rating 
means that the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is very 
strong (S&P, 2009a). 
 
4.2.1.4 Historical Context of Agricultural Finance in New Zealand 
 
In 1973 the Rural Bank and Finance Corporation (RBFC) was formed as a result of the 
agricultural sector’s crisis in the late 1960s and the consequent need to develop farming in 
New Zealand. The RBFC was fully owned by the government, and was funded by RBNZ. At 
the time, the financial, import and export markets were all government-controlled. At the 
same time the RBFC provided an array of concessionary type loans, with relatively low 
interest rates and extended terms. These included livestock incentive schemes, support finance 
schemes to finance budget deficits, land encouragement development loans, and export 
suspensory loans for horticultural businesses, among others (Source NZ6).  
 
The economic reforms of 1984 included deregulation of the financial industry as well as the 
removal of concessions to agriculture. The RBFC was initially left alone in its structure but 
was forced to increase the interest rates it charged from between 7.5 and 9% to commercial 
rates that were between 16 and 17%. Many farms had too much debt with the RBFC and 
some mortgagee sales ensued. Eventually many of these farming businesses went through 
debt-discounting schemes which adjusted mortgages to the values and rates of the time. The 
government suffered a large capital write-off, but managed to maintain the cash flow 
associated with the debt (Source NZ6).  
 
In 1988 the RBFC was sold to Fletcher Challenge, a private company, and that was when 
other commercial banks saw fit to enter the rural finance market. In 1992 it was sold to the 
National Bank (a fully-owned subsidiary of Lloyds Bank of London). In 2002/03 the National 
Bank was resold to its current owners, ANZ of Australia. At the time it was sold to Fletcher 
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Challenge, the RBFC had a 45% market share of rural lending. It now holds approximately a 
40% share of agricultural debt (Source NZ6).   
 
4.2.1.5 Structure of Agricultural Financing 
 
Regarding the rural sector in particular, credit for agriculture in New Zealand is supplied 
almost exclusively by registered banks. These include National Bank (NBNZ), Westpac 
(WP), Rabobank (RB), BNZ, ASB, and SBS (recently accredited as a registered bank).  
 
Total agricultural debt as at June 2009 was estimated at NZD 47.296 billion (RBNZ, 2009d).  
Registered banks accounted for NZD 46.096 billion of agricultural debt (over 97%) while a 
further NZD 1.2 billion was held by non-bank deposit takers. South Canterbury Finance 
(SCF) and PGG-Wrightson Finance (PGW) are among the more visible market participants 
within the non-bank sector.  
 
Agricultural debt in New Zealand has grown constantly since the early 1990s (Figure 17). The 
breakdown of debt figures, which was only available from 2003 onwards, shows how 
agricultural debt has grown over the years and is heavily weighted towards the dairy farming 
sector, which holds over 65% of agricultural debt held by registered banks as at June 2009. 
The data also shows how agricultural debt has increased over the past years in all major sub-
sectors, increasing two and a half times in dairy, and doubling in the case of grain, sheep and 
beef farming.  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from RBNZ (2009d) 
Figure 17: Credit to the New Zealand agricultural sector, total and by sub-sector, from 1991 to 2009. 
 
Agricultural credit has grown not only in nominal terms, but also in relation to its contribution 
to the economy (Figure 18). Considering that agriculture (excluding forestry) makes a 5% 
contribution to New Zealand’s GDP (Treasury, 2009a), 2009 data would imply that the 
agricultural credit to agricultural GDP ratio has grown further, and could already have 
exceeded 500% (RBNZ, 2009d; RBNZ, 2009j). This ratio would be approximately 400% 
when factoring into calculations the additional 1.1% contribution that forestry made to New 
Zealand’s GDP in 2008, and the NZD 1.2 billion overall debt the sector had with the financial 
system.  
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Source: RBNZ (2008) 
Figure 18: New Zealand Agricultural credit to Agricultural GDP (excluding forestry), and private sector 
credit to GDP ratios, from 1991 to 2008. 
 
4.2.2 Regulatory environment in New Zealand 
4.2.2.1 Capital Adequacy 
 
The New Zealand financial system is currently regulated using the Basel II Capital 
Framework (Basel II). It consists of a capital adequacy framework that builds on Basel I by 
increasing the sensitivity of capital to basic bank risks (Yeh et al, 2005). The Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand’s (RBNZ) requirement regarding minimum levels of capital to be held by banks 
is the main aspect of the regulatory environment that interviewees cited as affecting their 
lending practices (Sources  NZ1, NZ2, NZ4, NZ5, NZ6, NZ10). Non-bank deposit takers (i.e. 
finance companies) are moving towards a regulatory framework that is very similar to the 
Basel II bank capital regime. The move is scheduled to be completed by March 2010 (RBNZ, 
2009a).  
 
According to Yeh et al (2005), Basel II draws on a three-pillar approach which aims to find a 
better alignment between banks’ capital requirements and the risks faced. The three pillars 
include: the mechanics of capital requirement calculations; the roles that banks and 
supervisors have in ensuring that banks hold enough capital to meet risks and; the 
encouragement of market discipline through specific disclosure requirements.  
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Requirements regarding banks’ Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), defined as the amount of 
capital held by banking entities in relation to the risk they run, are the only way in which the 
(RBNZ) has any effect on lending practices. The four major banks in New Zealand (ANZ, 
National, Westpac and BNZ) are on the advanced model of Basel II, in which they can use 
internal models for credit and operational risk (RBNZ, 2009a; Source NZ10).  
 
RBNZ can influence how banks calculate the minimum level of capital they need to hold. 
Indeed, the previously-mentioned banks were awarded advanced Basel II accreditation on the 
proviso that they would allow RBNZ to modify their risk-modelling. This was done so that 
banks would hold higher levels of capital than what they intended to initially hold regarding 
the rural sector (Source NZ10).  
 
The banks themselves have instances of internal auditing to ensure that they comply with 
RBNZ prudential regulation. Monthly reporting to RBNZ is also done, though there is no on-
site auditing done on banks (Source NZ10).  
 
The average level of risk-weighted capital at the end of 2008 stood at 11.3%, of which 8.5% 
corresponded to Tier 1 capital. This means that the financial system at the time was holding 
1.4 times the minimum required capital, as per RBNZ regulations (RBNZ, 2009a). The Tier 1 
capital ratios reported by the four largest banks in New Zealand (ANZ-National, ASB, BNZ 
and Westpac NZ), as well as locally-owned banks (which includes KiwiBank Limited) is well 
above the minimum level of 6% set by the government to qualify for the wholesale funding 
guarantee, which aims to facilitate access to international financial markets by New Zealand 
financial institutions (Treasury, 2009b). 
 
4.2.2.2 Loan-loss provisioning 
 
New Zealand’s banks reported a three-fold increase in impaired assets between March and 
December 2008, bringing the total level of impaired or past-due assets to one percent of total 
lending at the time. The banks also reported a sharp increase in impairments during the 
opening months of 2009. As a result, the level of provisioning by banks was increased by 
NZD 600 million to over NZD 2.5 billion from December 2007 to June 2009 (Figure 19). 
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However, the ratio of provisions to impaired and past-due assets has fallen to a historically 
low level due to strong rise in asset impairments (RBNZ, 2009j). 
 
 
 
Source: RBNZ (2009j). 
Figure 19: New Zealand bank provisioning 
 
The RBNZ does not regulate loan-loss provisioning in the New Zealand financial system, so 
there is no supervision of banks’ provisioning procedures. Provisioning is done in-house at 
the banks, using their own criteria to determine the level of capital set aside for unexpected 
losses. Nonetheless, provisions are in a sense a standard for capital, and constitute an 
allowance to write off bad debt (Sources NZ6, NZ10). Interviewees did not disclose how their 
internal provisioning systems work.  
 
 
4.2.2.3 Official Cash Rate 
 
The Official Cash Rate (OCR) set by RBNZ is another aspect of the regulatory framework 
mentioned as having an effect on lending practices (Source NZ6). It was introduced in 1999, 
is reviewed eight times a year, and as at October 2009 the OCR stood at 2.5% (RBNZ, 
2009b). 
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The OCR influences the price of borrowing money in New Zealand, and is therefore a tool 
that RBNZ has at its disposal to influence inflation and the level of economic activity (RBNZ, 
2009b). This has replaced other inflation and money supply-influencing tools used in the past, 
such as required reserve ratios, which were abandoned in 1985 (RBNZ, 2009c).  
 
Most banks have settlement accounts with RBNZ, which are used to reconcile obligations 
with each other at the end of each trading day. RBNZ charges interest on overnight 
borrowing, while at the same time pays interest on settlement account balances at rates linked 
to the OCR. Market interest rates, especially shorter term rates are influenced by OCR. This 
can result in effects on inflation, as higher rates provide an incentive to save, therefore 
reducing consumption and as a result inflationary pressures. However, long term rates aren’t 
as affected by the OCR, as ultimately they depend on overseas rates. This is due to New 
Zealand financial entities being net borrowers in overseas financial markets (RBNZ, 2009b).  
 
4.2.2.4 Issues with the regulatory environment 
 
Some interviewees from the banking sector cited new minimum capital requirements for rural 
loans as a possible future issue that could influence either the interest rates charged to the 
rural sector or the permanence altogether of certain banks in rural lending. This is because 
rural lending would be considered riskier under new regulations whereby banks have to hold 
more capital (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ6, NZ8).  
 
In addition, there is the view that the level of capital holdings now required when lending to 
agriculture is high in relation to the sector’s actual risk, when looking at its historical 
performance or comparing it with other sectors (Sources NZ2, NZ6). A reason that rural 
assets can be considered risky is that they are subject to many types of lending risks, such as 
climate, currency, interest or counterparty risks (Sources NZ1, NZ2).   
 
Another issue is that other than monitoring for capital adequacy, the RBNZ is fairly loose in 
its regulatory approach. Lending is therefore greatly governed by risk management strategies 
from within the banks themselves. Banks spread their lending between different sectors in 
order to reduce their exposure to any one sector as they see fit (Source NZ6).  
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4.2.3 Supply of Agricultural Finance 
 
4.2.3.1 Banking Sector 
 
Financial products for agriculture in New Zealand can be separated into longer and shorter-
term lending. Lending to the rural sector is quite straightforward, as farmers tend to have 
strong balance sheets due to the large land component in their total assets (Source NZ3).  
 
Sourcing of funds across the banking sector is composed of the retail deposit base, which 
represents 60% of resources, while the remaining 40% is sourced from offshore markets 
(Sources NZ3, NZ4, NZ5). Some sources did mention that their banks’ offshore sourcing was 
closer to 30% (Source NZ4), while others stated that domestic sources had provided all their 
funding in the last year due to the bank’s “triple A” credit rating (Sources NZ1, NZ2). 
Sovereign risk due to the scale of overseas borrowing is lessened by RBNZ’s wholesale 
funding guarantee scheme (Source NZ3).  
 
4.2.3.1.1 To be approved for Credit  
 
The informants did not cite any predetermined requirements from a regulatory standpoint with 
regards to the information requested from those who apply for credit. The aim is to provide 
each client with a credit rating which will translate into a risk premium charged over the cost 
of funds. Credit quality, which is determined by risk profile and term duration, influences the 
margin charged over the cost of funds (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3, NZ4).   
 
4.2.3.1.1.1 Information 
 
The information required to make an accurate assessment of clients’ potential risk profile has 
objective and subjective components. Loan officers take these factors into consideration when 
assigning credit ratings to clients.  
 
The objective assessment includes financial documentation that helps lenders to, on one hand, 
evaluate where a client’s business stands at present as a result of past performance. On the 
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other hand, the information required should also show how the loan will be managed and the 
financial constitution of the farm business once the term of the loan has concluded.  
 
Banks therefore require past sets of accounts (balance sheets, budgets and cash flows from the 
previous three to five years) which are used to make an assessment on the trading history of 
the property. (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3, NZ4, NZ5, NZ7). This gives loan officers a historical 
perspective of the business, and whether it has had positive cash flows and has been profitable 
(Source NZ3). Budgets and cash flows going forward are also required so that account 
managers can evaluate the strength of the proposal and the debt-servicing capacity of clients 
(Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3, NZ4, NZ5).  
 
Other actions mentioned include doing credit checks on clients and requiring statements of 
financial position at the start and on completion of the loan (Sources NZ3, NZ4, NZ7). 
 
The subjective aspect of assessment involves farm visits in which loan officers make an effort 
to get to know clients on a personal level. The aim of this is to see how the farming operation 
works and to make an assessment of the valuation and the general state of the farm 
infrastructure (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ4, NZ5). The loan officer may access district averages 
to assess how the farmer has performed (Source NZ5). 
 
4.2.3.1.1.2 Securities 
 
The most common first choice that banks have in terms of assets to be used as securities are 
registered first mortgages on land and buildings. Banks also take plant and livestock, as well 
as dairy company shares. In some cases banks will take a general security agreement (GSA) 
which encompasses all the assets held by that business, including shares in companies. New 
Zealand banks would historically not go over 60% of the value of these securities (Sources 
NZ1, NZ2).   
 
Depending on the bank, land and buildings generally offer a 60 to 70% security margin 
(Sources NZ3, NZ4, NZ5, NZ7). Livestock provides 60% security based on bank standard 
values, which tend to be conservative (Sources NZ3, NZ4, NZ5). Major elements of plant, 
depending on their age and value, can provide between 25 and 100% security (Sources NZ3, 
NZ4), and dairy company shares can provide 60 to 100% security (Sources NZ3, NZ4, NZ5). 
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Regarding this last item, dairy company shares were not considered assets that could be used 
as security until recently. Because they have become such a large component of total dairy 
farm assets, they are now accepted as security (Source NZ4). 
 
4.2.3.1.2 Monitoring  
 
The level of monitoring of a business after funds have been approved depends on the quality 
of the account. Accounts are formally looked at on an annual basis (looking at the books and 
comparing with what was projected), and sometimes that revision process can be 
accompanied with a farm visit.  Term loan facilities generally get rolled over for a further 12 
months if everything is satisfactory (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ6, NZ7).  
 
Problem loans are exposed by the risk rating mechanisms, and accounts with higher levels of 
debt or which are partially performing will be monitored on a more regular basis (Sources 
NZ1, NZ2, NZ4, NZ5). Attempts are made to rehabilitate troubled accounts, but when it gets 
to a point where it becomes too far gone the banks take ownership of the securities (Source 
NZ5).  
 
The legal system is available to pursue issues with contractual agreements and is quite 
straightforward (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ6). Sometimes it is an issue of cost versus recovery, 
and can therefore be a relatively expensive and slow process to take ownership on securities. 
Faced with a potentially long dispute, parties may opt to just walk away (Source NZ6).  
 
4.2.3.1.3 Longer term lending 
 
The bulkiest demands for financing across all sectors involve land, either through acquisition 
(be it first-time or for expansion), or through a change in land-use. The latter has mostly 
involved conversions to dairy farming, which have typically been debt-funded exercises 
(Sources NZ3, NZ6).  
 
Term loans are offered to cover purchases of land, equipment and/or livestock (Sources NZ1, 
NZ2, NZ3, NZ4, NZ5, NZ5, NZ7). All-in-one type term loan facilities are also offered from 
which producers can cover their bulkier financing needs, which can include land, plant, 
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machinery and livestock (Sources NZ1, NZ2). Term loans typically mature at a maximum of 
15 to 20 years (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ4, NZ7). 
 
The base rate used for floating rates is pegged to the OCR, but most banks use a 90-day 
moving average benchmark rate known as the BKBM. The tendency to prefer fixed or 
variable rates depends on how the base rate is behaving (Source NZ3, NZ5).  
 
Interest rates were not easy to pinpoint by the managers interviewed, for reasons which 
included the credit rating assigned to each of the clients, as well as term length and volume of 
the loans (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3, NZ5). The recent volatility surrounding the cost of 
funding was also mentioned as a relevant factor (Source NZ5). The average farm would be 
paying 1.5 to 2.5% over base rates (Sources NZ3, NZ5). Other sources stated that 80% of 
farmers in New Zealand are paying between 6.5 and 8.5% interest on average (Sources NZ1, 
NZ2), whereas others placed rates for long term lending between 7 and 9% (Sources NZ4, 
NZ6, NZ7).  
 
More complex long-term wholesale products have also become a part of the rural financing 
landscape (Source NZ3). These are based on derivatives, involving interest rate swaps and 
treasury caps, and are mostly aimed at larger corporate clients (Sources NZ3, NZ4, NZ5). 
Interest rates for these types of products start at 7.5% (Source NZ3). 
 
4.2.3.1.3.1 Criteria 
 
Interest-only repayments can be agreed for a number of years if clients have strong balance 
sheets and present no concerns in the assessment process prior to the approval of funding 
(Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3, NZ7). This sort of arrangement promotes business growth as it 
gives farmers freedom to work up and down that facility (Sources NZ1,  
NZ2). 
 
For existing farmers, borrowing against their equity can be easily achieved as long as the cash 
flow component has been assessed correctly by the rural manager. However, cash flows may 
not display the expected behaviour for a number of reasons, which include weather-related 
events that have not been fully catered for, sudden escalations in the business’ cost structure 
and/or reduction in sale prices, or the client not performing as expected (Source NZ6). 
Regarding this last point, one informant had the viewpoint that losses do not occur when the 
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numbers have been correctly assessed, but they do occur when the client’s character has been 
poorly evaluated (Source NZ5).  
 
First-time producers may find barriers to this kind of financing as it has become increasingly 
hard to come up with the equity component, as land values have escalated steeply in the past 
decade (Source NZ6).  
 
4.2.3.1.4 Shorter term lending 
 
Apart from term loans, banks provide short term financing to cover production costs during 
the season. This can be done either through the use of working capital, revolving capital 
and/or overdraft facilities (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3, NZ4, NZ5, NZ7).  
 
The demands for this type of capital depend on the type of farming operation, as this 
influences the timing of income and expenditure. For instance, sheep farmers have lumpier 
cash flows than dairy farmers and that will have an effect on the extent of the facilities and 
how they are monitored (Sources NZ1, NZ2, NZ3).  
 
Interest rates are generally fixed for this type of capital. Shorter term money tied to 90-day 
bank bills starts at about 5% and overdraft facilities can cost around 9% (Source NZ4). One 
source mentioned that short term money for wholesale lending starts at 5.5%, and that retail 
rates would be a bit higher (Source NZ3).   
 
4.2.3.2 Non-Bank Financial Entities 
 
Non-Bank deposit takers supply less than 3% of agricultural financing (RBNZ, 2009d). The 
two companies interviewed have different approaches towards financing of agriculture. Both 
these companies are overseen by RBNZ, and will be under Basel II regulations in the near 
future (RBNZ 2009a, Source NZ8). 
 
One of the companies supplies credit in a fashion similar to the banking sector. This includes 
the provision of short and long-term financial financing for all major agricultural sub-sectors, 
of which a majority is secured by first ranking securities (first mortgage and first security 
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agreement over stock or machinery). Standard lending criteria regarding screening and 
monitoring practices are also used (Source NZ9).  
 
Interest rates offered can be either floating or fixed. The base rate for term lending is 7.2%, to 
which are added the term and risk premiums. Seasonal and check accounts cost 10.5% and 
livestock trading facilities, as they are unsecured, cost 11.95%. These rates are more 
expensive than those provided by banks because the company sources funds through bonds, 
debentures and lines of credit from banks, as well as using a third party’s facilities for the 
company’s transactional requirements (Source NZ9).  
 
The other company provides bridge finance to agriculture which means that it supplies capital 
that completes clients’ needs when banks are not willing to supply the full amount. The 
average term length for these loans is around 13 months, and they have interest rates that 
range between 9.5 and 14%. Funds are sourced by this company through the use of debentures 
and term investments. Securitisation is riskier as it involves the use of second mortgages, 
second specific or general security agreements, shares in other companies or other 
commercial property. Risk modelling is done for every client, though the information used for 
this is often provided by the bank that referred the client in the first place, with the client’s 
prior consent (Source NZ8).  
 
4.2.3.3 Issues with the supply of credit 
 
One of the issues mentioned was the growth of New Zealand’s agricultural sector, and the 
accompanying expansion of the lending market. The argument is that the lending sector has 
gone through 10 to 15 years of aggressive growth and high lending, and some businesses are 
carrying too much debt and need to restructure either through the injection of more equity or 
through the selling down of assets (Sources NZ1, NZ2). One informant’s personal opinion 
was that the rural sector’s growth was too fast in the last five years, and it may be time for the 
sector to “catch its breath” (Source NZ5). 
 
The high level of uncertainty has made lenders become more conservative in their approach to 
new business, and there is a feeling that in the short term, at least, there will be a return to 
more cash flow based lending, away from land-value based. The increase in land value was 
too often used when cash flows were not positive (Source NZ5). One source had a similar 
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point of view when stating that the problem was that for the last three to five years increased 
property values had hidden cash losses for poor performers. The correction of property values 
is now starting to show these poor performers (Source NZ9). Another informant stated that, 
although it was not done on an extensive basis, funding was made available for businesses 
wanting to grow and who had the equity to back it. This was despite these projects not having 
positive cash flows for some time. The risk with this was that debt could become unwieldy 
relative to income, or the equity could find itself reduced for whatever reason (Source NZ6).  
 
As a result of the sudden correction in values in the rural market, the banks will look more 
carefully at new proposals going forward (Source NZ4). Land prices out of sync with earning 
capacity, combined with higher volatility, means the banks will now require a higher 
contribution of equity, higher interest covers, and will look harder to the marginal returns on 
the extra lending. Finance is expensive and it looks as though loan-loss provisioning needs to 
be increased in all banks across all industries (Source NZ6). 
 
The distribution of debt is unevenly skewed towards a small number of farmers who hold a 
large proportion of agricultural debt (Source NZ6). Most of the debt in the NZ agricultural 
sector sits with the dairy sector, and the challenge in a low payout environment with a higher 
cost base is to drive cost out of the business to stay profitable (Sources NZ3, NZ5). Much of 
the debt in dairying sits with a minority of farmers, and most of these would be recent 
conversions in the South Island (Source NZ5). Some banks did their budgeting for dairy loans 
using higher payouts than would be considered prudent for some propositions and there is 
some stress in their books (Source NZ6). 
 
Farmers in the dairy sector, especially those who were in full expansion mode, are the ones 
who are struggling the most as they no longer have the cash flows to support what they were 
trying to do (Source NZ9). The viability of those farmers who are finding themselves 
stretched on their cash flows is conditioned on what happens to the long term outlook of dairy 
prices (Source NZ6). This informant also mentioned that some input suppliers were beginning 
to supply farmers with credit at the start of winter, which was attributed to farmers’ overdraft 
facilities reaching maximum levels before income resumed with the new milking season.  
 
Another issue for the banking sector now revolves around sourcing funds for lending as 
increased risk margins make it harder to access funds. Banks struggle to attract deposits from 
the rural sector, as farmers don’t let deposits sit for long, and look to reinvest funds, mostly 
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within the rural sector (Source NZ4). It is estimated that the deposit base from the rural sector 
is approximately NZD 6 billion. With lending in the sector over NZD 45 billion, the funds 
must be sourced either from other sectors, or from overseas (Source NZ6). 
 
Trading banks have a high level of short-term borrowing, most of which does not go over two 
year terms. Ideally, they should extend their borrowing terms. However, this is not likely to 
happen due to a very steep yield curve, which makes long-term funding very costly (Source 
NZ6). New Zealand also has an agricultural asset base which is under strain from a value 
point of view (Sources Wilson, 2009; NZ6). The previous points, combined with a tighter 
outlook on product prices and a greater level of uncertainty as to where those prices might go 
have caused banks to pull back within their policy guidelines. The guidelines hadn’t shifted as 
such, but with intense competition and a booming sector, banks had “stepped outside the 
guidelines a bit” (Source NZ6).  
 
The level of competition in the New Zealand rural finance market was also mentioned as an 
issue, due to it being a relatively small market (in terms of the number of clients) catered to by 
many banks. In this environment, competition results in a bidding war on price (Source NZ1). 
Prior to deregulation none of the trading banks were very interested in the rural sector. When 
they did enter the market many did so aggressively by undercutting market interest rates to 
grow their books rapidly (Source NZ8).  
 
However there is now a stronger emphasis on the support provided, as well as certainty and 
longevity of relationships, as competition forced partners to re-evaluate their relationships 
(Source NZ1). Some of the more complex financial products were introduced in part for 
competitive reasons, though sometimes farmers are not financially literate enough to deal with 
these instruments (Sources NZ1, NZ2). 
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    Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the Uruguayan and New Zealand 
agricultural financial systems, and explore the reasons for the differences encountered.  
 
5.1 Macroeconomic environment 
 
Regarding the macroeconomic aspect of this analysis, there are some significant differences 
between both countries’ economies. The size of New Zealand’s economy, represented by total 
GDP, is over four times larger than Uruguay’s. Agricultural activities were found to be a more 
important component of Uruguay’s economy at 9.1% of total GDP, compared to 6.1% in the 
case of New Zealand.  
 
The importance of agriculture for both countries lies in the importance it has for their foreign 
trade sectors. Although New Zealand’s export sector was over seven times larger than 
Uruguay’s, agricultural products represented over 60% of total export earnings for both 
countries in 2008. 
 
In terms of economic stability, inflation in New Zealand has been relatively stable, averaging 
2.5% since 1990. There was some volatility between 2006 and 2009, but the highest level of 
inflation only just exceeded 5% in the second half of 2008. By comparison, inflation in 
Uruguay has been far more volatile but has succeeded to remain in the realm of single digits 
since late 2004 after the huge spike in inflation which occurred during the 2002 crisis (Figure 
20). As the rate of inflation decreased, so did deposit and corporate loan rates.  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from INE (2009b) and RBNZ (2009i).  
Figure 20: Uruguayan and New Zealand inflation figures from 1998 to 2009 
 
 
Macroeconomic stability also influences Uruguay’s and New Zealand’s country credit risks, 
which are determined by international ratings agencies. Uruguay’s rating does not enable its 
financial sector to access overseas funding. As a result, sourcing of funds for lending is 
limited for the most part to the domestic deposit-base, though some banks also use profits 
from offshore placements. The Uruguayan trading banks had ratings of BB and lower in 2009, 
meaning that they had a low level of vulnerability to non-payment of obligations with 
investors. 
 
The high financial dollarization of Uruguay’s economy is a contributing factor to the 
unfavourable rating. However, the high level of matching between the currency of approved 
loans and that of borrowers’ income (as is the case for agriculture) reduces the level of 
exchange rate risk.  
 
New Zealand’s better country credit rating, along with the government wholesale funding 
guarantee scheme, has enabled its financial system to access overseas funds at competitive 
rates, and therefore expand its resource pool regarding sourcing of funds. Exchange rate risk 
is minimised for New Zealand’s overseas borrowing, as it is all either NZD-denominated or 
 74 
fully hedged against this risk. The major New Zealand trading banks all had credit risk ratings 
of A and above in 2009, which means that they have a strong ability to make repayments on 
obligations.   
 
5.2 Regulatory Environment 
 
The differences in the institutional frameworks which govern the financial systems in each 
country are influential to how lending activities are carried out. The Uruguayan and New 
Zealand regulatory frameworks have approached the supervision of their financial systems in 
different ways. The historical contexts in which they have evolved (i.e. their path dependence) 
provide some reasons that could explain the differences.  
 
Uruguay went through a severe financial crisis in 2002, which resulted in a deep recession, a 
number of failed banks, and a general crisis of confidence in the banking system and its 
oversight mechanisms. This resulted in the BCU implementing strict additional measures for 
the prudential regulation of the financial system. These included monetary tightening policies 
through increasing interest rates and reserve requirements; more detailed loan classification 
and provisioning systems; stronger disclosure requirements from banks regarding their risk 
management practices; and reporting debtors’ risk classification and total loan amounts within 
the banking system, among others.  
                                                                                     
By comparison, New Zealand’s financial system is much less rigorous in its approach to the 
supervision of banks, by concentrating on capital adequacy ratios and allowing banks to 
structure provisioning as they see fit. There is no required reserve ratio for the financial 
sector, and monetary policy has been controlled since 1999 via changes in the OCR. Apart 
from the implementation of the Basel I and II capital adequacy frameworks, as well as the 
OCR, the New Zealand regulatory environment has not had any substantial changes since the 
mid-1980s, when the deregulation of the financial system took place.  
 
5.2.1 Capital Adequacy 
 
Both financial systems use international standards to set capital requirements with which to 
shape their own regulatory environments. These are the Basel I and Basel II capital 
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frameworks, which are employed in Uruguay and New Zealand, respectively. The Uruguayan 
regulatory system has initiated the convergence towards Basel II, which would place it on par 
with its New Zealand counterpart by 2014.  
 
Regarding the New Zealand financial system, the RBNZ’s actions are centred almost 
exclusively on ensuring that banks hold enough capital relative to the average risk of their 
lending portfolios. As long as the banks hold sufficient levels of capital as per RBNZ 
prescriptions, they are free to structure their lending portfolios as they see fit. The average 
level of capital held within the system was 1.5 times the minimum requirement as of 
November 2009. However, the new risk-modelling under Basel II has resulted in banks 
having to increase their level of capital when lending to the agricultural sector. This is 
expected to make lending to agriculture more expensive, and would presumably lead to banks 
evaluating more closely any new lending to the rural sector.  
 
There were no major concerns encountered regarding capital adequacy when analysing the 
Uruguayan financial sector. This would presumably have to do with the fact that Uruguay’s 
banking system was holding on average over twice the minimum required level of capital 
required by the BCU. 
 
5.2.2 Loan-Loss Provisioning 
 
On the other hand, the BCU’s mandatory loan-loss provisioning schedule was found to be the 
aspect of the Uruguayan regulatory environment which had the strongest influence on lending 
practices. Unlike the New Zealand case, in which provisioning policy is left to the individual 
banks’ discretion, banks in Uruguay have to follow strict BCU guidelines in order to provide 
credit ratings to loan applicants. The credit ratings determine the amount of provisioning 
necessary, which in turn has a direct effect on the cost of credit for firms and individuals.  
 
As a result, the Uruguayan financial sector had an average ratio of provisions to impaired 
loans of 6.5 during the year to June 2009. The level of impaired loans remained constant 
throughout, at around 1%. In contrast, at the start of 2008 New Zealand’s level of impaired 
loans surpassed the level of provisioning that had been made. The gap between provisions and 
impaired loans widened all through to June 2009, despite there being a substantial increase in 
provisions during that period. This was due to the increase in provisioning being slower than 
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that of non-performing loans, which tripled in 12 months (from 0.5% to 1.5% of total 
lending). 
 
5.2.3 Further Comparisons 
 
The difference between capital adequacy and provisioning is that the former constitutes 
capital held in case of unanticipated downturns, whereas the latter’s purpose is to provide for 
expected losses (according to their probability of occurrence), and is recorded as a loss on the 
banks’ balance sheets. When comparing both countries’ situations it seems evident that the 
Uruguayan financial system has higher levels of capital holdings and provisioning than the 
New Zealand case. In other words, the Uruguayan system would seem to be better prepared 
against both expected and unexpected adverse events.    
 
As they stand, both countries’ systems have capital adequacy levels that surpass the 
thresholds prescribed by their respective central banks, with the Uruguayan system holding a 
higher level than the New Zealand financial sector. The scenario is different when comparing 
the levels of loan-loss provisioning in each country.  
 
By way of a rigorous Central Bank-prescribed and supervised system, Uruguayan banks make 
enough provisioning in their books to cater for over six times the actual level of impaired 
loans. This is achieved via a system which requires provisioning for all loans made, except 
those operations which are fully-backed.  
 
On the other hand, the New Zealand provisioning system was hardly able to keep up with the 
increase in level of distressed loans. If these troubled loans resulted in default the ensuing 
losses would have to be covered via the banks’ capital holdings. However, by comparison, the 
Uruguayan banks would be able to absorb that level of loan defaults on their balance sheets 
without having to resort to capital holdings.  
 
The question regarding the New Zealand regulatory system is that as the existing provisioning 
has not been sufficient to cover impaired loans, the banks will have to make use of their 
capital holdings to cover any defaults on loans.  It could also be the case that banks 
underestimated the risk of their portfolios becoming distressed, and of assets deteriorating as 
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they did. Regardless, this could be an indication that some sort of guideline needs to be 
implemented by the RBNZ in order to prevent such problems from re-occurring.  
 
It could be argued that the BCU’s provisioning system is overly demanding regarding the due 
diligence and disclosure requirements from banks. The result of this has been a system that is 
highly safeguarded against possible non-performing loans. The elevated level of provisioning 
compared to New Zealand, added to a level of capital adequacy that is double the amount 
required by regulatory authorities, means that resources which could be directed toward the 
supply of credit are withheld from the market. The high level of liquid capital retained as the 
banks’ required reserve ratio is yet another component of the potential resource pool that is 
not utilised when supplying credit. These elements contribute to elevating banks’ funding 
costs.  
 
A stricter prudential framework with higher information requirements from clients is also 
expected to reduce agency problems, as indicated by Utrero-Gonzalez (2007). This would 
seem to be the case for Uruguay, as the level of delinquent loans has decreased over time. 
However, this could also be due to banks reducing their exposure to risk, while avoiding 
dealing with those individuals or firms who could pose levels of default risk considered 
unacceptably high by the regulatory framework’s standards.  
 
What is more, the system makes it too expensive for borderline risky clients to access bank 
finance, as higher risk results in higher provisioning. This either causes risk premiums to rise, 
or forces banks to require more securities in order to minimise increases in risk premiums, or 
both. 
 
5.3 Financial Sectors 
 
It would be logical to expect the size of the financial sector in each country to reflect the size 
of its economy. This is true, as by mid-2009 the total level of credit to the non-financial sector 
in Uruguay was approximately USD 7.5 billion, compared to New Zealand’s over NZD 300 
billion (approximately equivalent to USD 190 billion at June 2009 exchange rate). However, 
when comparing debt relative to economy size, there are some more important observations to 
be made.  
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The ratio between total debt and total GDP in New Zealand has had a growing tendency over 
the years, with total debt surpassing 150% of total GDP in 2008. By comparison, Uruguay’s 
total debt-to-GDP ratio ranged between 20% and 25%, from 2005 to 2008. These differences 
are even more striking when considering the figures specific to agricultural debt GDP. 
Uruguay’s agricultural debt-to-GDP ratio was 26% in 2008, and though it had maintained a 
higher level than the total debt-to-GDP ratio since 2005, it never surpassed 30% in that 
period. In stark contrast, New Zealand’s agricultural debt-to-GDP grew at a much faster rate 
than the total debt-to-GDP ratio reaching close to 400% in 2008 (Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Uruguay and New Zealand 2008 debt, GDP, and debt-to GDP figures 
 
  Uruguay New Zealand 
Total GDP  (USD billions) 32,208 128,266 
Total Non-Financial Sector Debt (USD billions) 7,665 205,926 
Debt/GDP (%) 23.8 160.5 
Agricultural GDP (USD billions) 2,932 7,824 
Agricultural Debt (USD billions) 775 31,143 
Ag Debt/ Ag. GDP (%) 26.4 398 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from BCU (2009a), MGAP (2009), RBNZ (2009d) and Treasury 
(2009a). 
 
Uruguay’s total and agricultural debt-to-GDP ratios are both below the average for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and well below the figures for important regional players such as 
Brazil and Chile. New Zealand’s total debt to GDP ratio is consistent with the average figure 
for high income countries. The agricultural ratio however is almost 2.5 times the benchmark 
average (Table 7). It remains to be seen if that level of debt is sustainable in the long term.  
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Table 7: Regional and selected countries’ domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP.  
 
  
Domestic 
Credit to 
Private sector 
(% of GDP) 
Low & Middle Income 59.0 
     East Asia & Pacific 97.5 
     Europe & Central Asia 39.5 
     Latin America & Carib. 36.6 
          Argentina 14.5 
          Brazil 49.8 
          Chile 88.5 
          Uruguay 23.7 
     Middle East & Nth Africa 42.1 
     South Asia 44.7 
     Sub-Saharan Africa 70.4 
High Income 163.2 
          Australia 127.5 
          New Zealand 148.1 
          Euro Area 121.6 
          UK 190.0 
          USA 210.1 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Bank (2009). 
 
In terms of structure of the banking sectors one large difference between the countries is the 
presence of a state-run banking system in Uruguay, which holds just over half of the non-
financial sector’s debt. In the agricultural sector, the state-owned BROU is also the major 
supplier of credit, with 40% of the market share. According to the key informants, the private 
banks were found to favour working with larger, more entrepreneurial clients. This would 
present the banks with the advantage of economies of scale, as it is more cost effective to 
provide clients with larger volumes of credit (Gloy et al., 2005). Although the BROU 
competes openly with the private banks, as a state-run entity it also has an obligation to cater 
to those smaller clients not provided to by the private banks. This would explain some of the 
differences in the composition of clients by sub-sectors between the private and public 
banking sectors. A deeper analysis of the banks’ agricultural loan portfolios would be needed 
to confirm this.  
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In contrast, New Zealand’s banking sector is entirely privately owned. With regards to the 
agricultural sector, The National Bank was the largest supplier of financing, providing 
approximately 40% of sector credit.   
 
5.3.1 Agricultural Financing 
 
There are a number of reasons behind the differences encountered between the Uruguayan 
and New Zealand agricultural financing systems. The institutional setting was found to be a 
strong determinant of the size of the agricultural credit markets in both countries as were 
events in the recent past that had affected the agricultural sectors (La Porta et al., 1997; 
Gagliardi, 2008).  
 
During the 2002 financial crisis in Uruguay, default risk and arrears increased due to a high 
level of macroeconomic uncertainty. This led to a tightening of the regulatory framework 
regarding banks’ lending activities, in order to mitigate that type of risk. The stricter 
framework resulted in clients being considered riskier than they would have been in the past. 
This was expected, as systems which have stricter information requirements, such as the 
Uruguayan case, tend to make it more difficult for firms that are considered risky to access 
finance (Beck & De La Torre, 2007).  
 
Since the implementation of this stricter system, the Uruguayan agricultural sector reduced its 
relative level of debt with the financial sector from over 100% of sector GDP in 1999, to less 
than 30% in 2009, with arrears decreasing significantly. However, the sector’s GDP grew by a 
factor of 2.5 in that period of time, which would indicate that much of the growth in that 
period was achieved without the direct participation of the banking sector. The strengthening 
in the role of informal credit suppliers was part of the reason. However, even though it was 
possible to find out the type of credit they supplied (mostly seasonal), their actual share of 
agricultural credit was not determined. 
 
Cost of credit did not seem to be a major issue regarding the Uruguayan agricultural sector’s 
access to credit, as it was found that producers in Uruguay access credit through informal 
lenders at more expensive interest rates than those available via the banking sector. The fact is 
that as a result of the BCU’s strict prudential regime, a number of potential clients could be 
purposely avoiding the banking system to cover their financing needs.  
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It could be either because the system imposes requirements which can be either too costly 
and/or impractical to comply with, or because non-compliance with seemingly-minor items 
within the list of requirements is strongly penalised via an unfavourable credit rating. 
Therefore some farmers are willing to pay a higher price for credit that can be approved with 
fewer difficulties. Ironically, the informal lending sector in Uruguay sources its funding 
mostly from the domestic banking sector, and therefore channels those funds, for a fee, to the 
producers themselves.  
 
These issues are consistent with the concept of “risk-rationing” put forward by Boucher et al. 
(2008), as some farmers withdrew from the credit market when they found the requirements 
for access to credit too demanding. This is complemented by the further findings of Boucher 
& Guirkinger (2007) which showed that those subject to risk rationing turn to informal 
lenders for their financing needs, as observed in Uruguay. However, the findings of Boucher 
et al. (2008) and Boucher & Guirkinger (2007) were carried out in a rural development 
context, and any similarities encountered should take this into account.      
 
In contrast, New Zealand’s agricultural debt has had uninterrupted growth since 1991 to 2009, 
both in total and relative to GDP terms. In that period it grew nine times over, from NZD 5 
billion to over NZD 45 billion (and four times relative to agricultural GDP), with the dairy 
farming sector accounting for over 65% of that figure. By comparison, the largest level of 
exposure that the Uruguayan banks have with the agricultural sector is 25%, which 
corresponds to the sheep and beef farming sector (35% when including mixed livestock and 
cropping).  
 
The reason behind the sustained growth in New Zealand's agricultural debt include high levels 
of competition, which took off in the late-1980s to early-1990s when banks entered the rural 
banking sector en masse. This was complemented by a regulatory framework which, as has 
been mentioned, was not overly restrictive in its prudential policies. Credit to the rural sector 
further expanded from the early 2000s as world agricultural commodity prices improved.  
 
This resulted in a sector that in 2008 owed almost four times what it contributed to the 
economy, and with one sub sector responsible for the majority of this debt. There has been an 
increase in the volatility of agricultural commodity prices in general and dairy products in 
particular, in conjunction with deterioration in farm asset values. This could raise concerns 
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regarding the financial viability of particular agricultural sub-sectors, particularly the dairy 
farming sector.  
 
5.3.1.1 Term Lending 
 
When discussing agricultural finance, the literature mentions that the dominance of real estate 
in farming businesses’ overall financial assets creates a demand for longer-term financing 
(Barry & Robison, 2001). The combination of the high cost and limited term-length of term 
lending undermines this demand in Uruguay, as it limits access to those who can generate 
cash flows sufficiently large to cover the high costs in the limited time-frame. In New 
Zealand, these problems are presumably reduced due to a substantially smaller fixed-cost 
component in interest rates (i.e. the lower cost of mortgage registration), and term durations 
which are twice those in Uruguay. 
 
The virtual absence of facilities with maturities of more than ten years is perhaps another 
contributing factor in Uruguay’s reduced agricultural credit market, as it limits funding for 
operations involving land purchases or development projects. Limited term durations for 
loans could be financiers’ reaction to a perception of uncertainty regarding macroeconomic 
stability in the long-term. This could be linked to banks’ past experiences regarding periods of 
macroeconomic instability in Uruguay.    
 
Also relating to the cost and availability of long term credit in Uruguay is the cost of 
registering mortgages, which at approximately 4.5% of the mortgage value is significantly 
greater than to the approximately NZD 1000 it costs to register a mortgage in New Zealand. 
The shorter duration on average of term lending in Uruguay can be an aggravating factor, as 
there is a more limited time-frame in which to dilute the higher mortgage registration costs.  
 
Higher mortgage registration costs in Uruguay could also be an indicator of the existence of 
issues regarding property rights and land titling procedures, as well as the legal environment 
in place to protect creditors. This could potentially present problems to creditors if, in the case 
of loan default, the need came to recover mortgaged assets. This could be, as La Porta et al. 
(1997) indicate, a case of the legal environment influencing the size of the country’s capital 
market, as investors will be highly selective when determining who to surrender funds to in 
exchange for securities.  
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    Chapter 6  
Limitations and Further Research 
 
6.1 Limitations 
 
The research relied on interviews with key informants as a main source of information. One 
of the limitations encountered was that much depended on the detail with which the experts 
conveyed their knowledge, as well as the accuracy of their recollection of historically-
significant events. Personal opinions also influenced the quality of information derived from 
interviews. The use of various informants, as well secondary sources of information, helped to 
cross-reference, and complement much of the information generated. However, it was 
inevitable that certain gaps in the information remained. 
 
The need to constrain the boundaries of the research also presented certain limitations. The 
research was undertaken from the viewpoint of suppliers of finance.  Therefore, 
complementary information that could have been generated by obtaining producers’ 
perspectives was not included. Also, only a sample of informal financers in Uruguay was 
included in the research, as a complete survey of these would have required financial 
resources and time beyond what was available. Furthermore, for the purpose of this research, 
only those who provided credit-type financing were regarded as the informal agricultural 
financing sector in Uruguay. Other methods of channeling funds into the rural sector, such as 
investment funds, trust funds, securitizations and cattle agistment, among others (Nava, 
2003), were not included in this study. 
 
Finally, limitations were also encountered with the existing body of literature from which the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research were gathered. Most of the recent literature 
concerning agricultural finance was found to be focused on rural development of low income 
economies, or on transition economies. Searches utilising the CAB Abstracts, ABI/INFORM 
and EconLit databases yielded limited success when seeking literature focused on agricultural 
financing systems in mid and high-income economies (i.e. Uruguay and New Zealand, 
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respectively). Results were particularly limited when searching for literature produced in the 
years since 2000.  
  
6.2 Further Research 
 
Some of the further research that could build on the knowledge generated by this study could 
include working on areas identified as limitations related to the boundaries of the research. In 
this sense, research on producers’ perspectives concerning the agricultural financing systems 
of their respective countries could provide valuable information that could complement the 
findings presented in this thesis.  
 
Studies could also be directed towards surveying the whole informal agricultural financing 
sector in Uruguay in order to establish how much agricultural credit is actually provided to 
producers through all non-bank channels. Also, the findings suggested that there could be a 
situation of “risk rationing” of credit in Uruguay, as per Boucher et al. (2008), due to the 
strong presence of an informal sector that provides credit to agriculture. Further investigation 
could determine if this is in fact the case for Uruguay.  
 
The level of debt in New Zealand’s agricultural sector was found to be substantially higher 
than the average of all the sectors in its economy. Future studies could be directed towards 
further understanding the root causes of New Zealand’s high agricultural debt, and to 
establish if it is an abnormality among high-income economies or not. This line of research 
could also determine if the level of agricultural debt, as it stands, is sustainable in the long 
term.  
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    Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
The research started out by proposing questions whose answers could provide explanations to 
the issues identified as of interest. What follow are answers to those research questions.  
 
The first question aimed to learn how the agricultural financing systems of each country were 
structured. The findings revealed contrasting situations, with the existence of a more diverse 
system in Uruguay than in New Zealand. There was a formal financial sector in Uruguay 
which comprised four private trading banks, as well as the state-owned BROU. All the banks 
provided a full array of short, medium and long-term financing to the agricultural sector. The 
private banks were found to favour dealing with larger, more entrepreneurial clients, whereas 
the BROU was found to cater to a wider range of clients where possible. This was attributed 
to the BROU being a state-owned bank, which compelled it to attend to a wider market-
segment than the private banks. Agricultural debt with the banking system amounted to USD 
775 million in 2008, equivalent to approximately 26% of the agricultural sector’s contribution 
to total GDP in that year. The BROU had approximately a 40% share of the agricultural credit 
market. All the Uruguayan banks sourced their funding almost entirely from the domestic 
deposit base. 
 
The research also encountered an informal agricultural financing sector in Uruguay which 
included cooperatives, agricultural industries, and input suppliers, among others. The type of 
credit provided by these suppliers was mostly for term durations of less than one year, though 
some of the cooperatives facilitated medium-term credit to producers. No data was found on 
the level of debt that the agricultural sector had with the informal financing sector. The 
informal sector sourced its funding mainly through the local banks, as well as retained profits. 
In addition, cooperatives mentioned debentures and some access to overseas funds as other 
sources of funds. 
 
Providers of credit to New Zealand’s agricultural sector originated solely from the formal 
financial sector, with trading banks responsible for over 97% of the sector’s credit, and 
finance companies responsible for the rest. All of the trading banks were privately-owned, 
with one bank (National Bank of New Zealand) responsible for 40% of agricultural credit. 
Total agricultural debt in 2008 was in excess of USD 31 billion, equivalent to almost four 
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times the agricultural sector’s contribution to the economy. The dairy sector accounted for 
over 65% of agricultural debt. The New Zealand banks relied on the domestic deposit base for 
60% of their funding, with the remainder funded by foreign capital. The finance companies 
also used debentures as an additional source of funds.  
 
The second question asked how the institutional frameworks were constituted in each country 
with regards to agricultural financing. The regulatory environment, implemented by each 
country’s central bank, was found to have a strong influence on how financing of agriculture 
takes place. Macroeconomic, legal and cultural aspects of each country were also found to 
have an effect on agricultural finance. The Uruguayan financial system was regulated and 
supervised by the BCU, which worked under the Basel I regulatory framework. This 
framework establishes disclosure requirements from banks as well as minimum levels of risk-
weighted capital they should hold. These aspects of the regulatory environment were not 
considered to be major problems affecting producers’ access to credit in Uruguay. However, 
the BCU’s rigorous and compulsory loan-loss provisioning schedule was considered an aspect 
that had a strong effect on the agricultural sector’s access to bank credit. This was due to the 
high level of disclosure and paperwork required from clients in order for lenders to define the 
risk premiums charged. This in turn resulted in a higher cost of credit and/or higher collateral 
requirements for those clients who were assigned unfavourable credit ratings.  
 
New Zealand’s RBNZ used the Basel II regulatory framework to regulate and supervise its 
financial system. Under this framework the change in how the agricultural sector was viewed 
regarding its relative risk was a central concern to those interviewed in New Zealand. The 
higher perceived risk of agriculture resulted in New Zealand banks having to hold more 
capital relative to the agricultural component in their lending portfolios, therefore making 
agricultural credit more expensive to producers. Unlike the Uruguayan system, New Zealand 
banks were free to structure their loan-loss provisioning schedules as they saw fit.  
 
Long-term macroeconomic instability, high foreign debt and an elevated level of financial 
dollarization were among the factors which negatively affected Uruguay’s credit risk rating. 
This acted as a hindrance to banks’ chances of accessing overseas funds for their lending 
activities, effectively making the domestic deposit base the only source of funds for banks’ 
lending activities. The level of long-term macroeconomic uncertainty was also identified as a 
possible reason for the shorter duration of long term lending in Uruguay, in comparison with 
New Zealand.   
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On the other hand, a sound macroeconomic environment resulted in New Zealand having a 
favourable credit risk rating, which enabled its financial sector’s ability to access overseas 
funds. This expanded the credit market by increasing the supply of available funds. However, 
the reliance on overseas funding also increased the New Zealand financial sector’s 
vulnerability to disruptions in the supply of foreign capital should the rating deteriorate. 
 
According to key informants, the legal systems in both countries worked adequately to protect 
creditors in case of loan defaults, although recovery of collateral could entail a long and 
expensive process. For that reason a special effort was made by creditors to avoid such 
situations. However, the level of scrutiny under which Uruguayan producers were placed 
during banks’ screening procedures could suggest that there could be issues with the legal 
system regarding collateral recovery. 
 
In addition, the fact that in Uruguay a notary public was always required for registering 
mortgages (at a substantially higher cost than in New Zealand) would suggest that some 
issues may exist in that country regarding land titling. Accordingly, the use of land as a 
security was rare in Uruguay. This restricted the number of producers that could access higher 
volumes of credit, such as land purchases and large-scale infrastructure or development 
projects. In contrast, the use of land as collateral was a usual feature of financing packages for 
agriculture in New Zealand, which facilitated land purchase operations as well as large 
development projects. 
 
Although the analysis of cultural factors was not central to this research, they were found to 
also play a part regarding access to agricultural financing. Uruguayan farmers were 
considered to be somewhat distrustful of the banking system and its requirements in terms of 
information and collateral, which encouraged them to seek out informal credit providers when 
possible. Producers’ distrust was attributed by many as a result of the financial crisis of 2002, 
in which credit availability all but disappeared and farmers were forced to find alternatives to 
their financing needs while still having to service debt. A low level of financial literacy of 
farmers in general was also perceived as a factor that reduced the effective use of credit. By 
comparison, producers in New Zealand were not at all averse to using bank credit and, 
according to informants, were financially literate enough to use credit efficiently.  
 
The third research question intended to find out how agency problems were dealt with when 
providing credit for agriculture in each country. In the formal financial sectors of Uruguay 
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and New Zealand the most important efforts to minimise agency problems were made during 
the screening process, prior to the approval of credit facilities. The Uruguayan banking sector 
worked under a strict regime imposed by regulatory authorities, which indicated the type of 
information that should be required from clients and the type of assets that could be used as 
collateral, among others. Those elements were used to assess clients’ risk, and ultimately 
determine their possibility of access to credit. As the New Zealand financial system was not 
subject to the same regulatory rigours as its Uruguayan counterpart, the level of client scrutiny 
was not as demanding. Still, there were similarities across the New Zealand banks regarding 
the type of information and collateral required from producers to supply them with credit. 
Banks in both countries also made subjective assessments of their clients’ characters and 
capabilities. 
 
Close monitoring of accounts after funds were released only occurred when signs of distress 
emerged. Barring that, contact between clients and loan officers occurred only a few times a 
year, and accounts were generally monitored through repayment performance. In addition, 
according to informants in both countries, good relationships with clients were essential to 
reducing the need for close monitoring.    
 
Informal providers of credit in Uruguay were found to focus more on character and capability 
assessment, as well as monitoring clients’ performance. In certain cases these elements acted 
as a substitute for collateral for unsecured loans. Higher interest rates charged were also a 
substitute for reduced collateral. This was feasible due to those financiers having a higher 
degree of contact with producers, as well as not being governed by the BCU’s regulatory 
framework. 
 
The final research question put forward for this thesis intended to learn the reasons for the 
differences encountered in this study. The answers to the previous three research questions 
already provide reasons to explain the differences encountered. The limited use of bank credit 
by Uruguay’s agricultural sector relative to its contribution to the economy was due to a 
combination of factors. The financial crisis of 2002 was the most significant event in recent 
history which brought about the institutional framework and financial landscape observed in 
this research. The increased level of macroeconomic instability that followed the crisis led to 
international credit rating agencies’ downgrading of Uruguay’s country sovereign credit risk 
rating. This limited banks’ ability to access overseas funding, and therefore restricted 
available funds to the domestic deposit base.  
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Another consequence of the financial crisis was a tightening of the prudential and regulatory 
environment by central bank authorities, which resulted in the availability of bank credit 
being restricted mainly to the least risky clients. This promoted an informal financial sector 
which provided mostly seasonal capital to those left outside the banking system or to those 
who found that complying with the requirements for access to bank credit was too time-
consuming and/or costly. The limited term duration of long term lending (generally less than 
ten years), combined with a high cost of mortgage registration were also factors that limited 
the demand for long-term and high-volume credit. As a result, land purchase and large 
development projects through the use of credit were not found to be common occurrences in 
Uruguay.  
 
One other factor worth mentioning was key informants’ viewpoint that producers in general 
were reluctant to increase their level of debt with the banking system. At the time of the 2002 
financial crisis the agricultural sector in Uruguay was carrying a high level of debt, which was 
gradually brought down. Producers would be disinclined to risk that happening once again. 
 
In New Zealand, the level of debt attributed to the agricultural sector in relation to its 
contribution to the economy was significantly higher than the national average. This was 
owing to a number of reasons. New Zealand’s favourable credit risk rating meant that banks 
could access overseas funds at competitively-priced interest rates, thus expanding the credit 
market beyond the national deposit base. 
 
The regulatory authorities in New Zealand did not intervene greatly in banks’ risk 
management practices, as long as they complied with minimum requirements of capital 
adequacy and disclosure procedures. This, combined with a high level of competition between 
banks in the rural sector since the late 1980s, as well as an expansion of dairy farming since 
the early 2000s, meant that many banks’ growth in lending remained unchecked as they 
stretched the boundaries of prudent risk management. In addition, the relative 
straightforwardness and low cost of land mortgaging contributed to a higher level of access to 
long term credit for farm development and land acquisition. Increases in the value of rural real 
estate also contributed to the increase in demand for credit.  
 
In summation, this comparative study showed that there are indeed differences between the 
agricultural financing systems of Uruguay and New Zealand. In Uruguay, the institutional 
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framework limited producers’ possibilities of accessing bank credit. Producers there were able 
to access costlier seasonal capital and some medium-term capital from informal lenders such 
as cooperatives, processors and input suppliers, among others. Nevertheless, if they required 
medium and long term credit, Uruguayan farmers needed to deal with the banking system. 
The lack of access to international credit markets by Uruguayan banks was an additional 
factor which limited credit availability. Almost the exact opposite was found in New Zealand. 
An institutional framework which promoted access to credit, combined with open access to 
overseas funding for banks, meant that the agricultural sector was able to expand its use of 
credit uninterruptedly since 1991. However, New Zealand’s agricultural debt was found to be 
greatly exposed to one subsector (the dairy farming sector). Moreover, the level of debt of 
New Zealand’s agricultural sector surpassed its contribution to GDP many times over, which 
raised doubts concerning the long-term sustainability of that level of debt. 
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     Appendix A 
Interviewed sources 
The following is a full list of the key informants interview for the purpose of this research. 
The names of informants and the organisations to which they belonged at the time of the 
interviews have been suppressed in the interest of confidentiality.  
 
A.1 Uruguay 
 
U1 High ranking manager in the agricultural finance area of the BROU.  
 
U2  High ranking manager in the agricultural finance area of the BROU.  
 
U3 High ranking manager in the agricultural finance area of a private trading bank.  
 
U4 High ranking manager in the agricultural finance area of a private trading bank.  
 
U5 High ranking manager in the agricultural finance area of a private trading bank.  
 
U6 High ranking manager in the agricultural finance area of a private trading bank. 
 
U7 Retired General Manager of the agricultural finance area at BROU. 
 
U8 High ranking manager of an agricultural cooperative. 
 
U9 High ranking manager of an agricultural cooperative and wool-processing industry. 
 
U10 High ranking manger of an agricultural cooperative and dairy-processing industry. 
 
U11 High ranking manger of an agricultural cooperative and dairy-processing industry. 
 
U12 Technical advisor at OPYPA (Agricultural Planning and Policy Office).  
 
U13 High ranking official at INIA (National Agricultural Research Institute).  
 
U14 Agricultural Manager in the malt barley industry.  
 
U15 Commercial agent from a fertiliser company. 
 
U16 Commercial agent from a fertiliser company.  
 
U17 Director of an agricultural consulting firm/ Former Minister of Agriculture. 
 
U18 Notary Public. 
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A.2 New Zealand 
 
NZ1 Senior agribusiness analyst at a trading bank. 
 
NZ2 Branch Manager at a trading bank. 
 
NZ3 Area Manager in the agribusiness area of a trading bank. 
 
NZ4 Rural Manager at a trading bank. 
 
NZ5 Sector Partner in the agribusiness area of a trading bank. 
 
NZ6 Rural Economist at a trading bank. 
 
NZ7 Senior agribusiness manager at a trading bank. 
 
NZ8 General Manager of the rural area of a finance company. 
 
NZ9 Manager of the rural finance branch of a rural services company. 
 
NZ10 Senior Official at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  
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     Appendix B 
The following are sample interview guides used to interview the key informants. Not all 
questions to all informants, as there were variations in their level of knowledge of different 
subject areas. Also, different interview guides were used with different types of key 
informants.  
 
In addition to the questions from the interview guides, informants were also asked how the 
situation had changed regarding the different areas covered during the interview, how that had 
affected their policies, and what changes they viewed as likely in the future.  
 
B.1 Interview Guide for Banking Sector 
 
General: 
 
- What types of financial products does your organisation provide the agricultural sector?  
- What are the costs of the various types of financing you provide? What are the factors that 
influence interest rates?  
 - Do you offer clients different types of rates (fixed and floating)? If so, what do 
producers prefer? 
- How do you determine the margin charged over the cost of funds? 
- How does your bank fund its financing of agricultural activities? 
- Can producers restructure their debt if they are at risk of missing repayments or defaulting? 
How do you manage problem loans? 
- How do you obtain new clients? 
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Monitoring and Screening: 
 
- How do you generate information on new clients in order to assess their credit-worthiness? 
- What are the steps that a request for financing has to go through in order to be approved? 
- How are clients approved for financing? What criteria need to be met? What documentation 
do producers have to provide in order to receive financing? 
- What sort of collateral is required for financing? What does it depend on? If you provide 
different types of financing, do you have different collateral requirements? 
- How is risk managed and/or mitigated? 
- What sort of monitoring is used after financing has been approved?  
- Are relationships with clients an important part of your lending practice?   
- How does competition with other finance suppliers affect these relationships? 
 
Institutional Setting: 
 
- What government policies affect the cost and availability of credit?  
- How do Central Bank policies regulate lending in general? What regulations and/or 
restrictions are there? 
- Are there legal restrictions on interest rates, terms, or other aspects of financing? 
- Are there any specific Central Bank regulations concerning agricultural lending?  
- Are there any issues with the upholding of contractual agreements? How does the legal 
system work to uphold contractual agreements between lenders and borrowers? 
- How are lenders protected against defaults on loans? Can collateral be easily recovered?  
 
 
 
 105 
Concerning different sub-sectors: 
 
- Are there differences in demand for different types of financing in the following sub-sectors 
(if you finance any of these)? If so, elaborate. 
 - Sheep and Beef 
 - Dairy 
 - Cropping 
 - Forestry 
- Do the requirements to obtain credit approval from your organisation vary among sub-
sectors (documentation, collateral, etc)? If so, how do they vary? 
- Are there differences in the cost of financing these different sub-sectors? What are they?  
 
Closing questions: 
 
- Are there any issues concerning the financial sustainability of the agricultural sector? Are 
there any differences between the sub-sectors mentioned? 
- Where do you feel that the agricultural financing system is lacking, or could be improved?  
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B.2 Interview Guide for Non-Banking Sector 
 
General: 
 
- What type(s) of financing does your organisation provide the agricultural sector?  
- Why do producers opt for financing through your organisation rather than directly through 
the banking sector? (What are the advantages or benefits for borrowers/lenders)? 
- What is the cost to producers of the financing you provide? How does it compare to the 
banking system? 
- Can producers restructure their debt if they are at risk of missing repayments or defaulting? 
How do you manage problem loans? 
- How does your organisation fund its financing of agricultural activities? 
- How do you obtain new clients? 
 
Monitoring and Screening: 
 
- How do you generate information on new clients in order to assess their credit-worthiness? 
- How are clients approved for financing? What criteria need to be met? What documentation 
do producers have to provide in order to receive financing? 
- What sort of collateral is required for financing? What does it depend on? If you provide 
different types of financing, do you have different collateral requirements? 
- How is risk managed and/or mitigated? 
- What sort of monitoring is used after financing has been approved?  
- Are relationships with clients an important part of your lending practice?  
- How does competition with other finance suppliers affect these relationships? 
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Institutional setting: 
 
- What government policies affect the cost and availability of credit?  
- What regulations are your lending practices subject to? Are there organisations that regulate 
your financing activities?  
- Are there issues with the upholding of contractual agreements? How does the legal system 
work to uphold contractual agreements between lenders and borrowers? 
- How is your organisation/firm protected against defaults on loans? Can collateral be easily 
recovered?  
 
Concerning different sub-sectors: 
 
- If the organisation finances more than one sub-sector, are there differences in demand for 
different types of financing in the following sub-sectors? 
 
 - Sheep and Beef 
 - Dairy 
 - Cropping 
 - Forestry 
- Do the requirements to obtain credit approval from your organisation vary among sub-
sectors? If so, how do they vary? 
- Are there differences in the cost of financing these different sub-sectors? What are they?  
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Closing questions: 
 
- Are there any issues concerning the financial sustainability of the agricultural sector? Are 
there any differences between the sub-sectors mentioned? 
- Where do you feel that the agricultural financing system is lacking, or could be improved?  
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B.3 Interview Guide for other Expert Informants 
 
General: 
 
- How is the agricultural financing sector structured in this country?  
- Who provides financing?  
- What type of financing do they provide? 
- What proportion of total financing do the different institutions have? 
- How would you characterise the availability, level of access and ease of access to financing 
by producers?  
- What sort of barriers, if any, do producers encounter when applying for credit?  
- Do they vary according to the organisation providing the financing?  
- Do they vary according to the type of producer (small or large, family or commercial) 
- Do they vary according to production type?  
- What is the cost of financing agricultural production in this country? What factors influence 
it, and how? 
- What is the level of debt of the farming sector? Is the farming sector able to service its debt? 
Is the sector as a whole solvent? In regards to this issue, are there differences between the 
sub-sectors? 
- How does the financial sector (banking and non-banking) finance its operations?   
- What is the level of competition in the agricultural financial sector (among banks, between 
banks and other entities)?  
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Monitoring and Screening: 
 
- What is the level of screening that farmers go through in order to be eligible for finance? 
What criteria need to be met? What documentation do producers have to provide in order to 
receive financing? Does it depend on the type of organisation providing the financing (bank 
or non-bank)? 
- How do the different finance-providing organisations monitor the performance of their loans 
once they have approved and released the funds? Is the level of monitoring in this country 
adequate, in your opinion? 
 
Institutional Setting: 
 
- What is the regulatory environment like for lending in general, and agricultural lending in 
particular? How does the Central Bank operate? 
- What government policies affect the cost and availability of credit? 
- Are there legal restrictions on interest rates, terms, or other aspects of financing? 
- Are there any specific Central Bank regulations concerning agricultural lending?  
- Are there any issues with the upholding of contractual agreements? How does the legal 
system work to uphold contractual agreements between lenders and borrowers? 
- How are lenders protected against defaults on loans? Can collateral be easily recovered?  
- Are there cultural aspects that influence how producers approach external financing?  
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Closing questions: 
 
- Are there any issues concerning the financial sustainability of the agricultural sector? Are 
there any differences between the sub-sectors mentioned? 
- Where do you feel that the agricultural financing system is lacking, or could be improved?  
 
 
 
 
